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Abstract 
Chapter 1 studies the relationship between income inequality and the occurrence of banking crises for 
33 advanced countries between 1970-2011. Differently from other empirical studies, the focus of this 
study is on levels rather than growth rates of income inequality. A statistically significant and positive 
relationship is found between the value of the Gini index and the probability of banking crises. This 
result is confirmed when income distribution is summarized by the top 1% income share1. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether macroprudential policies have been effective to address booms in in bank 
and household credit. Most of the previous empirical literature with cross-country data assess the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies in curbing credit growth. However, in this study estimations 
are conducted with a binary dependent variable capturing credit booms. The results show that an 
aggregate index including five different macroprudential policy instruments is negatively and 
significantly associated with domestic bank credit booms. The results for aggregate indexes are robust 
to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects. Moreover, macroprudential policies are also found to 
be effective to reduce the likelihood of booms in household credit. Finally, this study shows that 
macroprudential policies are effective to address specifically those credit booms that are followed by 
systemic banking crises. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of macroprudential policies on banks’ systemic risk in advanced and 
developing countries during the period 2000-2015. The main findings suggest that a tighter 
macroprudential policy stance in a country is negatively and significantly associated with the level of 
systemic risk for banks. Moreover, tighter conditions for concentration limits seem to reduce the growth 
rate of systemic risk. Finally, the results also show that tightenings of macroprudential policies were 
negatively associated with the growth rate of systemic risk for banks prior to the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This chapter is titled ”Income Inequality and Banking Crises: Testing the Level Hypothesis Directly” and has 
been accepted for publication in the Journal of Macroeconomics. The paper is available on the following 
website: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2018.08.007. 
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Abstract 
We perform an empirical analysis to investigate the relationship between income inequality and the 
occurrence of banking crises on a panel of 33 advanced countries in the period 1970-2011. Differently from 
other empirical studies, we focus on levels rather than growth rates of income inequality. We find a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the value of the Gini index and the probability of banking crises. 
This result is confirmed when income distribution is summarized by the top 1% income share. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, it has been claimed by some prominent scholars that income inequality may be responsible
for financial crises. This point of view is well summarized in the influential book by Rajan (2010, p. 43),
according to whom “growing economic inequality in the United States led to political pressures for more
housing credit. This pressure created a serious fault line that distorted lending in the financial sector”.
While the argument is not fully new (see Galbraith, 1954, for instance), other researchers (e.g., Krugman,
2007, Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2009 and Stiglitz, 2012, among others) have endorsed what is now referred to
as the “Rajan hypothesis”, linking income inequality to the surge in household indebtedness which has been
found to be a major predictor of banking crises.1
The hypothesis put forward by Rajan and other scholars has triggered a vigorous debate (see the ex-
haustive and updated surveys by Van Treeck, 2014 and Bazillier and Hericourt, 2017), and a relatively small
group of studies have tried to investigate empirically the relationship between income inequality and the
occurrence of banking or financial crises. We aim at participating to this growing debate by means of an
econometric analysis that tests the link between levels of income inequality and the probability of banking
crises. Differently from other scholars (see in particular Bordo and Meissner, 2012 and Perugini, Ho¨lscher
and Collie, 2016) we test this link directly. Our study encompasses a panel of 33 advanced countries in the
period 1970-2011. The main finding of our paper is that the level of gross income inequality (measured by
either the Gini index or the top 1% income share) is positively associated with the occurrence of banking
crises. Furthermore, we find that the effect of an increase in the level of income inequality is sizable. In
addition, the effect seems to be larger for countries that already have an elevated level of income inequality.
Finally, the results hold for a series of robustness checks, such as, among the others, the rare events small
sample bias, the inclusion of regional and time fixed effects, the exclusion of various country groups.
There are several reasons to claim that the relevant measure of income inequality is the level and not
the growth rate when investigating the association between income inequality and the likelihood of banking
crises. First of all, the theoretical literature by Iacoviello (2008) and Kumhof, Ranciere and Winant (2015)
emphasizes the existence of a long-run relation between household debt and income inequality. As a conse-
quence, the use of the growth rate of income inequality that removes the long-run trend as in the studies
by Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) seems problematic. In fact,
the use of the growth rate of income inequality will lead to biased estimates if a long-run relation exists
between income inequality and household debt as emphasized by Klein (2015). Iacoviello (2008) argues that
1See also Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016). Iacoviello (2008) shows that in the U. S. the prolonged rise of the
1980s and the 1990s in household debt can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality.
See also Roy and Kemme (2012).
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short-term movements in household debt can be explained by business cycle fluctuations while the connec-
tion between household debt and income inequality is a long-term one. Klein (2015) uses panel cointegration
techniques, and shows that a long-run relation exists between income inequality and household debt. This
result is consistent with Malinen (2016), who also finds a long-run steady-state relationship between the top
1% income share and domestic bank credit. In short, both the theoretical and empirical literature emphasize
that income inequality is related to household debt only in the long-run, which suggests that the level of
income inequality (rather than the growth rate) is the suitable measure in this study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and places our analysis in
perspective with respect to other empirical studies. Section 3 describes the dataset and variables. In Section
4 we provide a description of our empirical approach and the statistical model (4.1) followed by a discussion
of our findings (4.2) and their robustness (4.3). Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The first paper that investigates directly the relationship between income inequality and banking crises is
Atkinson and Morelli (2011). Their approach is purely descriptive and focusses on the presence of a link
between increases in income disparity (as measured by the Gini index as well as the top 1% income share) and
the occurrence of banking crises in 25 countries between 1911 and 2010. They fail to detect any meaningful
link between increases in income inequality before the occurrence of banking crises and the occurrence itself.
A similar conclusion is reached by Bordo and Meissner (2012) in a paper which became a benchmark for
the subsequent literature. They test the Rajan hypothesis for a sample of 14 advanced countries between
1870 and 2008 and find that a credit boom increases the probability of a banking crisis.2 However, they
cannot detect any evidence that a rise in top income shares accelerates the boom. The strategy employed
by Bordo and Meissner consists in investigating whether credit growth influences the likelihood of banking
crises, and then verifying if a change in income inequality is associated with higher credit growth. In the first
step, logit and OLS estimations are conducted with a binary banking crisis dependent variable and lagged
real credit growth as independent variable. They show that credit growth in the previous two to five years is
strongly and positively associated to a crisis. In the second step, the top 1% income share is regressed against
cumulative growth in credit during the previous five-year period. They reject any relationship between credit
growth and the growth in top income share.
Gu and Huang (2014) use data similar to Bordo and Meissner (2012), but reach different results, possibly
because cross-section heterogeneity is taken into account by including countries that can be considered to be
2A similar conclusion is reached by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Using a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the
years 1870-2008, they conclude that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises.
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outliers. Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) perform logit estimations to investigate the existence
of a direct link between changes in top income share and the likelihood of banking crises. Again, the
primary dataset is the same as Bordo and Meissner (2012). The year-on-year change in income inequality is
found to have some predictive power both in-sample and out-of-sample. Income inequality turns out to have
substantial predictive power over and above credit booms and has a distinct role as a driver of financial crises
that remains when controlling for credit growth. These results suggest that the empirical strategy employed
by Bordo and Meissner might be unsuitable to detect the link between income inequality and banking crises.
Bellettini and Delbono (2013) were the first ones to investigate directly the “level” hypothesis to see
whether persistently high levels of Gini values relate to banking crises. The quantitative analysis is descriptive
and the association seems weak, although non-negligible. They make a remark on the geography of such
association (see also Atkinson and Morelli (2015, p. 49)) to stress that its assessment should be primarily
focused on the crisis-originator countries (e.g., US and UK for the 2008 banking crises) where the link
between growing income inequality and banking crises seems pretty robust (see, for instance, Gu and Huang,
2014).
Atkinson and Morelli (2015) test statistically both the “growth” and the “level” hypothesis relying on
an updated version of their previous database (Atkinson and Morelli, 2014). The authors find no clear-
cut conclusion for the relationship between growing or high levels of economic inequality (summarized by
different indexes) and the occurrence of banking crises in the period 2000-2012.
Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) also test the “level” hypothesis by means of an econometric analysis
where high levels of top income shares are shown to be robustly correlated to private sector indebtedness
which in turn is a significant predictor of systemic banking risk.3 The econometric analysis is performed
on a panel of 18 OECD countries for the years 1970-2007. They explicitly take into account endogeneity
and reverse causation issues by using IV and GMM-sys methodology. As in Bordo and Meissner’s paper,
private sector credit is found to be a significant predictor of financial crises. However, it is worth stressing
that Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) do not investigate the presence of a direct link between income
inequality and financial crises that is not explained by credit growth.
As for the choice of credit measures, Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) consider both household and
corporate credit, but try to control for this by including investment as a percentage of GDP. This is the same
route followed by Bordo and Meissner (2012). However, notice that retained profits are also often used to
finance investments, which implies that the ratio between investments and GDP may be a suboptimal proxy
for credit. The main features of the above mentioned literature are summarized in Table 1 below.
3Klein (2015) detects a long-run relationship between income inequality and household debt. He uses different measures of
income inequality for 9 advanced countries in the period 1953-2008 and finds that inequality and leverage are cointegrated.
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Table 1: Main features of some related empirical papers
Atkinson
and
Morelli
(2011)
Bordo and
Meissner
(2012)
Bellettini
and Del-
bono
(2013)
Gu and
Huang
(2014)
Atkinson
and
Morelli
(2015)
Perugini,
Ho¨lscher
and Collie
(2016)
Kirschen-
mann,
Mali-
nen and
Nyberg
(2016)
Period 1911-2010 1928-2008 1980-2010 1928-2008 1900-2012 1970-2007 1870-2008
Number
of coun-
tries
25 14 ad-
vanced
countries
14 or 18 14 ad-
vanced
countries
25 18 OECD
countries
14 ad-
vanced
countries
Measure
of income
inequality
Gini and
top 1%
income
share
Top 1%
income
share
Gini Top 1%
income
share
Many Top in-
come
shares
Top 1%
income
share
Growth or
Levels
Growth Growth Levels Growth Growth
and Levels
Levels Growth
Relationship
between
income
inequal-
ity and
banking
crises
Ambiguous Ambiguous Weak Strong in
Anglo-
saxon
countries
Ambiguous Strong∗ Strong
∗ Between income inequality and private sector indebtedness.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The dataset consists of yearly data for 33 advanced countries during the period 1970-2011.4 A description
of variable definitions and sources is provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.5 Data on the binary
variable banking crisis has been compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2013). The authors define a banking crisis
as an event that meets two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as
indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations). (2) Significant
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and
Valencia, 2013). Our dataset includes a total of 123 country-year banking crisis observations distributed
across 33 banking crisis episodes.
The income inequality measures are the Gini index and the top 1% income share before taxes and trans-
fers. Data on the gross Gini index have been collected from the Standardized World Income Inequality
4The list of countries is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
5The control variables shown in Tables A1 and A2 were constructed using data from the World Bank Databank, International
Financial Statistics (IMF), BIS total credit statistics, Economic Freedom of the World Database (Fraser institute) and OECD.
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Database (SWIID) compiled by Solt (2016). The latest version of the SWIID database contains two collec-
tions of Gini indexes. The first one consists of the gross income inequality series from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) database. The second collection includes data from national statistical offices, cross-national
income inequality databases, and academic articles (Solt, 2016).
Data for the top 1% income share before taxes and transfers have been collected from the World Top
Incomes Database (WTID) which is based on historical income tax records. Accurate information about
measures such as the mean household income is necessary to compute the Gini index. These measures
can be unreliable since they are based on data affected by country-dependent inconsistencies (Kirschen-
mann, Malinen and Nyberg, 2016). However, the top 1% income share measure is computed using the same
procedure and raw data for all countries (Piketty, 2007). In addition, data for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10%
income shares is exploited to perform robustness tests.
Other related papers used disposable (or after tax) income to compute Gini indexes and/or top income
shares. Our choice of gross incomes seems reasonable for at least three reasons. First, data on net income
shares over time are currently very limited. Similarly, data on net Gini indexes are also limited relative to
the gross ones. Finally, gross and net income shares tend to mimic similar developments in the distribution
of income (see Malinen, 2016, p. 312, fn. 3).
Figure 1 illustrates the average gross (or market) Gini index and the top 1% income share over the
period 1970-2011 for 33 advanced countries. The general trend for both measures of income inequality is
characterized by a steady increase since the 1980s.
The behavior of the average Gini index, the top 1% income share and the ratio of household credit to
GDP around a banking crisis episode is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows that the level of the
Gini index (average for 27 advanced countries) is higher at the beginning of the banking crisis (vertical line)
than during the previous 15 years. Moreover, the top 1% income share (average for 14 advanced countries)
is also at its peak on the eve of the crisis compared to the preceding years as shown in Figure 3.
Household credit (as a percentage of GDP) is included in these figures because the main theoretical
argument used to support the connection between income inequality and banking crises is based on the
expansion of household credit. The ratio of household credit to GDP (average for 21 advanced countries)
almost doubles during the 15 years before the banking crisis and then falls back to its previous level once
the crisis has started.
The United States is a “crisis originator” country and is an especially important case when investigating
the link between income inequality and banking crises. Figures 4 and 5 display the behavior of the average
Gini index, the top 1% income share and household credit (as a percentage of GDP) around the two banking
5
Figure 1: Market Gini index and top 1% income share (average of 33 countries)
crises that started in 1988 and 2007 in the United States.6
Figure 4 shows that the Gini index was higher in the United States on the eve of the banking crisis
compared to a decade earlier. Moreover, the Gini index and the ratio of household credit to GDP tend to
move in tandem during the run-up to the crisis (the correlation is 0.83). Finally, the top 1% income share
doubled during the 15 years before the crisis and then dropped once the crisis started, as shown in Figure
5. The co-movement between the top 1% income share and household credit (as a percentage of GDP) in
the United States is even stronger than for the Gini index (the correlation is 0.92).
Descriptive statistics for the banking crisis variable, income inequality measures (Gini index and top
income share) and the control variables are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. It should be emphasized
that data availability for the Gini index is considerably larger than for the top income share. The average
value for the market Gini index is around 0.43 with a maximum of 0.58 for Hong Kong in 2002 and a
minimum of 0.245 for Latvia in 1990. The top 1% income share has a mean value of 0.09. The highest
6The control variables shown in Tables A1 and A2 were constructed using data from the World Bank Databank, International
Financial Statistics (IMF), BIS total credit statistics, Economic Freedom of the World Database (Fraser institute) and OECD.
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Figure 2: Gini index and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis
value (0.23) for the top 1 percent income share is observed in the United States in 2007, while Portugal had
the lowest value (0.04) in 1981. Finally, on average around one third of all gross income goes to the top 10
percent of income earners and one fourth of this amount is earned by the top 1 percent.
4 Empirical analysis
The empirical approach employed in this paper follows Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). We estimate
both a baseline and an extended specification using logit regressions. For all countries and years, the
binary dependent variable equals one if a banking crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The measures of income
inequality level (gross Gini index and the top 1% of gross income share) are lagged from one up to three
periods to avoid simultaneity issues. The baseline and extended specifications include a set of explanatory
variables that are commonly found in the literature to control for macroeconomic fundamentals, monetary
conditions and the global environment. More precisely, the baseline specification includes the real growth of
GDP, the change in terms of trade, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, the real interest rate, inflation,
and GDP per capita. The extended specification instead includes all control variables of the baseline model,
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Figure 3: Top 1% income share and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis
but also the ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves, the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP
and the lagged growth rate of domestic bank credit.
The macroeconomic fundamentals are real GDP growth, inflation and nominal depreciation. A slowdown
in GDP growth is likely to be associated with a banking crisis since lower economic growth negatively affects
banks balance sheets by increasing the share of non-performing loans. An elevated inflation rate may be a
sign of macroeconomic mismanagement which often precede banking crises (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011).
In addition, banking crises have been found to often follow or coincide with currency crises. Consequently,
nominal depreciation is employed as a proxy for high volatility in the nominal exchange rate that typically
characterizes currency crises. However, even in the absence of a currency crisis, a nominal depreciation could
potentially cause a banking crisis due to foreign exchange risk (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011). Finally, GDP
per capita (divided by one thousand to ease interpretation) is used as a proxy for institutional and economic
development (Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005).
Monetary conditions are proxied by the real interest rate in both the baseline and the extended specifi-
cation. An increase in the real interest rate is a proxy for a tightening of financial conditions which is likely
8
Figure 4: Gini index and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis (USA)
to squeeze banks balance sheets and increase the probability of a banking crisis (Duttagupta and Cashin,
2011).
The extended specification includes additional variables that are ignored in the baseline model. The ratio
of private sector bank credit to GDP is used as a measure of the size of financial markets and institutions
(financial deepness). Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) argue that excessive levels of credit are associated
with financial crises according to the literature and emphasize that the effect of stronger credit growth on
the probability of financial crises depends on the level of credit to GDP. The lagged growth rate of real
domestic credit is included as a proxy for credit booms that often precede banking crises (Schularick and
Taylor, 2012).
Another variable, added to the extended specification, is the ratio of broad money (M2) to foreign
exchange reserves. This variable measures a countrys vulnerability to currency crises which often coincide
with banking crises. This variable was divided by one thousand to ease interpretation.
The global environment is proxied by the change in terms of trade in both the baseline and the extended
specification. This variable has been divided by one trillion to ease interpretation of the coefficient. The
9
Figure 5: Top 1% income share and household credit (% of GDP) around banking crisis (USA)
change in terms of trade is likely to affect GDP growth and consequently the stability of the banking sector
(Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011). Finally, the occurrence of a crisis is likely to affect the future path of the
explanatory variables, which would generate endogeneity issues. To mitigate this problem, five observations
are dropped after the first year of crisis, which implies that all crisis observations except the first year are
dropped. In addition, White-Huber robust standard errors clustered by country are used throughout the
paper except for the results presented in Tables A12-A13.
4.1 The statistical model
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the level of income inequality is associated with the
occurrence of banking crises. To this end, we model the probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate
logit model. Formally, let yit be a binary variable equal to 1 if a banking crisis occurs in country i during
year t, and 0 otherwise, and let xit be a vector of K explanatory variables. We assume that the probability
of observing a crisis depends on xit through the following expression:
Prob(yit = 1|xit) = piit(β) = 1
1 + exp (−x′itβ)
,
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where β is a vector of K unknown parameters to be estimated. The nonlinearity of the this expression
implies that, contrary to the linear regression model, the parameters β do not measure the effect on the
probability of a crisis of a change in one of the explanatory variables. Indeed, it is easy to check that for a
continuous explanatory variable xk,it the marginal effect on the probability of a crisis is given by:
∂Prob(yit = 1|xit)
∂xk,it
= piit(β)[1− piit(β)]βk,
where βk is the coefficient that multiplies xk,it in the definition of piit(β). Thus, unlike the linear regression
model, the marginal effect of a change in one of the regressors varies across the observations, and depends
on the original probabilities piit(β). In particular, the effect is shrunk to zero if the occurrence of a crisis
is either extremely unlikely (piit(β) ≈ 0) or extremely likely (piit(β) ≈ 1), and will be highest for values of
piit(β) close to 0.5. Note however that βk is informative on the sign of the marginal effect, as the shrinking
coefficient piit(β)[1− piit(β)] is positive by construction.
Given a sample of observations {(yit, xit), t = 1, 2, . . . , T, i = 1, 2, . . . , Nt}, the unknown parameters β
can be estimated by maximizing the sample loglikelihood function of the model:
logL(β) =
T∑
t=1
Nt∑
i=1
[yit log piit(β) + (1− yit) log (1− piit(β))] .
Under suitable regularity conditions, and when the sample size grows to infinity, the resulting Maximum
Likelihood Estimator converges to the true value of β and is normally distributed. In samples of finite
size, its distribution will only be approximately Gaussian. Its variance matrix is readily provided by any
econometric package.
4.2 Results
If a higher level of gross income inequality is associated with the occurrence of banking crises, we would
expect the coefficients of the lagged Gini index to be positive and significant. The results displayed in Table
2 show that the coefficients of the Gini index have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the Gini coefficients are positive and highly significant for all lags in both
the baseline and the extended model. Consequently, the significance of the Gini index is not sensitive to the
specific choice of the number of lags or to the inclusion of measures of the level and growth rate of domestic
credit to the private sector.
The baseline estimation for the Gini index covers 33 countries and 24 crisis episodes for the period 1970-
2011. Due to data limitations for domestic credit and the ratio of M2 to international reserves, the extended
estimation includes 28 countries and 20 crisis episodes for the same period.
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Table 2: Results for logit estimations with Gini index, period 1970-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.181*** −0.177*** −0.177*** −0.265*** −0.274*** −0.257***
(0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0507) (0.0620) (0.0613) (0.0630)
totchange 0.0622*** 0.0613*** 0.0565*** 0.0845*** 0.0858*** 0.0813***
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0190)
depreciation −0.0739*** −0.0738*** −0.0736*** −0.0885*** −0.0884*** −0.0873***
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0214)
realinterest 0.0306 0.0416 0.0372 0.0616 0.0660 0.0488
(0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0724) (0.115) (0.119) (0.130)
inflation 0.0664 0.0743 0.0734 0.0311 0.0360 0.0116
(0.0621) (0.0624) (0.0597) (0.0574) (0.0557) (0.0594)
gdp pc 0.0293*** 0.0295*** 0.0285*** 0.0500*** 0.0507*** 0.0508***
(0.00856) (0.00878) (0.00897) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0122)
m2 reserves 0.0107 0.0107 0.0101
(0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0156)
credit gdp 0.0123** 0.0130** 0.0120**
(0.00505) (0.00533) (0.00549)
L2.credit growth 0.0175 0.0162 1.622
(0.0218) (0.0230) (2.552)
L.gini market 0.118*** 0.180***
(0.0390) (0.0586)
L2.gini market 0.118*** 0.188***
(0.0383) (0.0574)
L3.gini market 0.106*** 0.180***
(0.0379) (0.0550)
Observations 588 575 566 417 413 406
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.09 95.83 95.94 96.40 96.13 96.06
% Crises Correct 8.333 8.333 8.333 25 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 99.82 99.64 99.82 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.178 0.178 0.175 0.275 0.277 0.276
Chi−sq 35.72 35.44 34.75 44.16 44.28 43.96
p−value 8.20e−06 9.22e−06 1.25e−05 3.08e−06 2.93e−06 3.35e−06
AIC 180.8 180 179.9 138.4 137.8 137.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Gini index is a useful measure of total income inequality in a country, but it can be integrated
with additional information. To this end, we can use the top 1% income share (before taxes and transfers)
similarly to Atkinson and Morelli (2015).
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline and extended estimations with the top 1% income share. The
coefficient multiplying the top 1% income share is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level for the
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Table 3: Results for logit estimation with top 1% income share, period 1970-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.308*** −0.291*** −0.312*** −0.275*** −0.239** −0.264***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.0955) (0.0913) (0.101) (0.0833)
totchange 0.0630*** 0.0665*** 0.0198 0.0583*** 0.0651*** 0.0308
(0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0169) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0197)
depreciation −0.0689*** −0.0741*** −0.0588*** −0.0727*** −0.0813*** −0.0670***
(0.0176) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0224) (0.0220) (0.0254)
realinterest 0.0823 0.0839 0.0148 0.155 0.172 0.0804
(0.0684) (0.0762) (0.0767) (0.0998) (0.124) (0.142)
inflation −0.0692 −0.0651 −0.125* 0.0233 0.0359 −0.0405
(0.0761) (0.0790) (0.0749) (0.0863) (0.109) (0.117)
gdp pc 0.0369*** 0.0379*** 0.0241* 0.0426*** 0.0473*** 0.0330***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0111)
m2 reserves 0.00229 −0.00249 0.000922
(0.0101) (0.0196) (0.0110)
credit gdp 0.0159* 0.0163* 0.0129*
(0.00826) (0.00912) (0.00776)
L2.credit growth −0.00640 −0.00698 3.298
(0.0198) (0.0229) (4.457)
L.topincomep99 12.82*** 19.55***
(4.289) (7.405)
L2.topincomep99 13.30*** 21.12**
(4.536) (8.334)
L3.topincomep99 4.077 12.10*
(5.271) (7.175)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.57 96.52 96.17 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 6.667 6.667 0 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.195 0.202 0.145 0.223 0.238 0.178
Chi−sq 25.04 25.82 18.43 25.74 27.40 20.37
p−value 0.000748 0.000542 0.0102 0.00411 0.00225 0.0260
AIC 119.5 118.3 124.9 111.6 109.7 116.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
first and second. However, the top 1% income share is not significant at lag three in the baseline model, and
is only significant at the 10% level in the extended model.
Overall, these results suggest that a higher level of the top 1% income share is associated with a higher
probability of banking crises. This finding reinforces the results found for the Gini index, even though
statistical significance is generally weaker for the top 1% income share. The baseline model estimation is
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based on a sample containing 15 banking crises in 19 countries, while the sample used to estimate the extended
model contains 14 banking crises distributed across 18 countries. Turning the attention to macroeconomic
fundamentals, we note that the coefficient of contemporaneous real GDP growth is negative and highly
significant in all estimations. This finding is consistent with Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and
suggests that lower GDP growth precede or coincide with the onset of banking crises. In addition, the
coefficient of GDP per capita is positive and significant.
The estimate of the inflation rate coefficient is positive but insignificant in Table 2, and insignificant with
a fluctuating sign in Table 6; this is different from Demigu¨rc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), who find the
inflation rate coefficient to be positive and significant for 94 advanced and developing countries. It should
be emphasized that our paper only includes advanced countries for which the volatility of the inflation rate
is typically lower than for developing countries. Finally, the coefficient of nominal depreciation is found to
be negative and highly significant in all specifications.
Concerning monetary conditions, the real interest rate has a positive but insignificant coefficient in all
estimations reported in Tables 2 and 3. Furthermore, the estimates of the credit to GDP coefficient is
positive and significant in all specifications. This result is in line with the findings in Perugini, Ho¨lscher and
Collie (2016).
Among the global conditions, the coefficient of the change in terms of trade is estimated to be positive
and highly significant. Finally, the coefficient for the ratio of broad money (M2) to foreign exchange reserves
is insignificant in all estimations.
The results above clearly show that a higher level of income inequality is associated with a higher
probability of a banking crisis occurrence. The question is, how large is the effect of the level of income
inequality on the probability of a banking crisis. We follow the approach by Kirschenmann, Malinen and
Nyberg (2016) and calculate the average marginal effects for the Gini index and the top 1% income share.
Table 4 shows the average marginal effects of the Gini index and the top 1% income share for columns
1 and 4 in Tables 2 and 3. The average level of the Gini index for the extended model and the full sample
has a standard deviation of about 5.87. An increase in the level of the Gini index (lagged 1 period) by
one standard deviation raises the likelihood of a banking crisis by 3.81 percentage points. An increase in
the probability of a banking crisis by 3.81 percentage points is economically a large effect given that the
frequency of a crisis episode is only 4.8 percent in the full sample.
Furthermore, the standard deviation is around 0.03 for the average level of the top 1% income share in
the extended model for the full sample, meaning that an increase of one standard deviation in the level of
the top 1% income share raises the probability of a banking crisis by 2.21 percentage points (the frequency
of a crisis is 4.3% in this sample).
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Table 4: Average marginal effects of Gini index and top 1% income share
Baseline Extension
Variable Full sample >50% >75% Full sample >50% >75%
L1.Gini 0.0041*** 0.0058* 0.0131*** 0.0065*** 0.0120** 0.0171***
(0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0055)
Observations 588 316 168 417 223 117
Countries 33 31 25 28 25 18
Crises 24 16 11 20 14 10
Std. Dev. 3.1269 1.5216 1.2988 3.0268 1.3066 1.0691
L1. Top 1% income 0.4038*** 0.6073*** 0.7452*** 0.6888*** 1.4458*** 2.0375**
(0.1534) (0.2050) (0.2476) (0.2610) (0.3452) (0.9283)
Observations 408 210 119 324 172 95
Countries 19 16 14 18 16 13
Crises 15 8 5 14 8 4
Std. Dev. 0.0190 0.0170 0.0157 0.0191 0.0179 0.0160
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It could be of interest to examine whether an increase in the level of income inequality depends on the
initial level of inequality. The 50th and 75th percentile for the Gini index and the top 1% income share are
computed based on the full sample in the baseline and extended specification respectively. The standard
deviation is around 3.9 for the Gini index for countries above the 75th percentile in the extended model.
An increase of one standard deviation in the level of the Gini index for countries above the 75th percentile
increases the probability of a crisis by 6.60 percentage points. Consequently, the effect of an increase in the
level of income inequality on the likelihood of crisis is higher if the country already has a high level of income
inequality.
To conclude, the results show that the level of income inequality before taxes and transfers is positively
and significantly associated with banking crises. Moreover, the effect of an increase in the level of income
inequality on the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis is relatively large in economic terms. Finally,
the results suggest that an increase in the level of income inequality has a bigger effect on the probability of
banking crises if the country already has an high level of income inequality.
4.3 Robustness and sensitivity analysis
We now estimate a set of different specifications to test the robustness of the results illustrated in the previous
section.
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4.3.1 Bias-corrected estimation results
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a logistic regression model are consistent but only
asymptotically unbiased. King and Zeng (2001) point out that the finite sample bias is exacerbated when
events are rare, i.e. when the frequency of observation of the rarer of the two outcomes is very small. More
specifically, the bias can lead to a sharp underestimation of the probability of the rarer event. Since in
our full sample we observe 33 banking crisis events for the 33 countries over the interval 1970-2011, it is
important to investigate whether the results discussed in section 4.2 are driven by the bias due to the rare
events phenomenon.7
Using an extensive Monte Carlo analysis, Leitgo¨b (2013) compares the bias in ML estimates with the
bias in three alternative estimation approaches: Exact Logistic Regression (Cox and Snell, 1989), the Bias
Correction Method by King and Zeng (2001), and the Penalized Maximum Likelihood (PML) approach by
Firth (1993). His conclusions are that PML seems to be the best available option to overcome the small
sample bias problem, because it appears to be essentially unbiased and easy to apply.8 PML estimates are
computed by maximizing the sum of the likelihood function and a penalty function equal to one-half the log
of the determinant of the information matrix.9
Table 5 shows the PML estimation results for the baseline and extended specifications of Table 2, which
includes the lagged Gini index. In both specifications, the Gini coefficient estimates have the expected
sign and are significant at the 5% level at all lags, instead of the 1% level as in Table 2. This difference
appears to be due mainly to an increase in the estimated standard errors, rather than to a change in
parameter estimates, at least for the baseline specifications. Table 6 reports the PML estimation results
for the baseline and extended specifications of Table 3. The conclusions are qualitatively the same as for
the previous table, but the decrease in accuracy arising from shifting from ML to PML implies that the
top 1% income share variable is not statistically significant anymore, except for the extended specifications
which include its first two lags, and even though the point estimates of the parameters do not change much.
Overall, our conclusion is that the results in section 4.2 are robust w.r.t. the rare events small sample bias,
at least when inequality is measured using the Gini index.
4.3.2 Including regional and time fixed effects
The next issue we consider is whether the results still hold when models include country fixed effects. One
way to check if this is the case amounts to estimating logit regressions with country fixed effects. However,
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
8See also Alter, Feng and Valckx (2018) and Arnold and Nguyen Long (2018) for an application of PML to logistic regression
with rare events.
9PML estimates can be computed in Stata using the firthlogit package (see Coveney, 2015).
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Table 5: PML results for the Gini index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.231*** -0.240*** -0.234***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
totchange 0.065** 0.064** 0.059** 0.075** 0.076** 0.072**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
depreciation -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
realinterest 0.033 0.043 0.039 0.026 0.032 0.035
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122)
inflation 0.081 0.089 0.087 0.025 0.033 0.040
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125)
gdp pc 0.029** 0.029** 0.028** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
m2 reserves 0.014* 0.014* 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
credit gdp 0.010 0.011* 0.012*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
L2.credit growth 2.382 2.063 1.671
(3.648) (3.594) (3.604)
L.gini market 0.114** 0.150**
(0.052) (0.075)
L2.gini market 0.113** 0.156**
(0.050) (0.074)
L3.gini market 0.102** 0.151**
(0.049) (0.072)
Observations 588 575 566 416 412 406
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.09 96 95.94 95.19 96.12 96.06
% Crises Correct 4.17 4.17 4.17 20 20 20
% No-Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R-sq 0.241 0.240 0.238 0.443 0.444 0.446
Chi-sq 29.22 29.20 29.06 27.80 27.67 27.87
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0019 0.0020 0.0019
AIC 130.133 129.299 129.176 75.587 75.202 74.999
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
this procedure implies that the number of available observations in the specifications shown in Tables 2 and
3 drop by at least one third. Consequently, we include macro-region fixed effects, following Magud and
Vesperoni (2015) and Hutchinson (2002). These dummy variables control for region-specific unobservable
time-invariant characteristics, and are essentially equivalent to an aggregated form of fixed effects analysis
(Magud and Vesperoni, 2015). Accordingly, the 33 advanced countries in the dataset were divided in six
different geographic regions.10
10The 33 countries are divided into the following 6 regions: North America and Australasia (Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States), South Europe (Israel, Italy, Portugal and Spain), East and Southeast Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden),
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Table 6: PML results for the top 1% income share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth -0.306*** -0.289** -0.304*** -0.268** -0.238** -0.254**
(0.117) (0.116) (0.110) (0.120) (0.120) (0.114)
totchange 0.064** 0.062* 0.043 0.053* 0.051 0.049
(0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (0.032) (0.038) (0.048)
depreciation -0.057** -0.062** -0.052* -0.058** -0.062** -0.059*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
realinterest 0.080 0.078 0.019 0.103 0.114 0.071
(0.100) (0.102) (0.103) (0.133) (0.139) (0.135)
inflation -0.033 -0.036 -0.089 0.038 0.042 0.016
(0.096) (0.100) (0.094) (0.140) (0.158) (0.150)
gdp pc 0.036** 0.037** 0.025 0.040** 0.043** 0.032*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
m2 reserves 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
credit gdp 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
L2.credit growth 3.614 2.769 3.361
(4.753) (4.927) (4.627)
L.topincomep99 12.214 16.113*
(7.611) (8.873)
L2.topincomep99 12.322 16.733*
(7.647) (9.196)
L3.topincomep99 4.310 11.614
(8.199) (9.871)
Observations 408 402 392 323 320 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 95.57 96.52 96.17 96.28 96.25 95.9
% Crises Correct 7.14 7.12 0 16.67 16.67 7.69
% No-Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R-sq 0.273 0.280 0.196 0.398 0.409 0.309
Chi-sq 18.67 19.17 14.75 18.44 19.44 16.39
p-value 0.0093 0.0077 0.0394 0.0480 0.0351 0.0889
AIC 83.966 83.259 90.663 62.410 61.731 68.697
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 shows the estimation results of the baseline and extended specifications including regional dummy
variables and the Gini index. In the baseline model, the Gini coefficient has the expected sign and is significant
at the 10% level for the first and second lag of the Gini index. In comparison to the specifications without
regional dummies, the third lag of the Gini index is no longer significant. All lags of the Gini coefficient are
significant at the 5% level in the extended specification. Finally, the coefficient for the top 1% income share
is significant at the 1% level in both the baseline and extended estimations shown in Table 8.
Similarly to Magud and Vesperoni (2015) as well as Bordo and Meissner (2012), we include yearly dummy
Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore) and Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
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Table 7: Results for Gini index including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.172*** −0.170*** −0.171*** −0.371*** −0.386*** −0.390***
(0.0593) (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0774) (0.0785) (0.0809)
totchange 0.0721*** 0.0721*** 0.0689*** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.128***
(0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0291)
depreciation −0.0695*** −0.0688*** −0.0689*** −0.0806*** −0.0799*** −0.0782***
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0212)
realinterest 0.0391 0.0494 0.0463 0.123 0.127 0.0865
(0.0843) (0.0863) (0.0861) (0.112) (0.117) (0.148)
inflation 0.0624 0.0700 0.0705 0.0356 0.0438 0.00360
(0.0692) (0.0695) (0.0675) (0.0795) (0.0803) (0.0732)
gdp pc 0.0308*** 0.0308*** 0.0301*** 0.0592*** 0.0613*** 0.0637***
(0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0208)
d NA Australasia −1.055 −1.047 −1.075 −0.535 −0.508 −0.580
(0.968) (0.973) (0.977) (1.029) (1.033) (0.955)
d South Europe 0.364 0.365 0.355 0.718** 0.760** 0.615
(0.485) (0.501) (0.489) (0.364) (0.379) (0.488)
d East Europe 0.317 0.285 0.260 − − −
(0.964) (0.994) (1.001) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.669 −0.642 −0.706 −0.791 −0.833 −1.121
(0.464) (0.466) (0.478) (0.501) (0.534) (0.752)
d Asia −1.291* −1.286* −1.346* −1.484** −1.584** −1.619**
(0.783) (0.768) (0.752) (0.666) (0.635) (0.651)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves 0.00641 0.00550 0.00196
(0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0249)
credit gdp 0.0109** 0.0122** 0.00958*
(0.00516) (0.00560) (0.00539)
L2.credit growth 0.0441* 0.0455* 4.541
(0.0263) (0.0274) (4.449)
L.gini market 0.0749* 0.161**
(0.0427) (0.0812)
L2.gini market 0.0765* 0.172**
(0.0438) (0.0801)
L3.gini market 0.0661 0.174**
(0.0441) (0.0758)
Observations 588 575 566 403 399 392
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.09 96 96.11 96.03 95.99 95.92
% Crises Correct 4.167 8.333 8.333 20 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 100 99.82 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.200 0.199 0.198 0.307 0.310 0.318
Chi−sq 40.16 39.77 39.41 48.81 49.28 50.21
p−value 0.00013 0.00015 0.00017 0.00004 0.00003 0.00002
AIC 186.4 185.7 185.3 140.3 139.4 137.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Results for the top 1% income share including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.338*** −0.305** −0.324*** −0.308** −0.258** −0.293**
(0.130) (0.133) (0.125) (0.120) (0.130) (0.118)
totchange 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.0897*** 0.0923*** 0.112*** 0.0940***
(0.0201) (0.0181) (0.0325) (0.0205) (0.0239) (0.0337)
depreciation −0.0579*** −0.0653*** −0.0534*** −0.0698*** −0.0805*** −0.0734**
(0.0168) (0.0145) (0.0170) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0302)
realinterest 0.129* 0.125 0.0865 0.187** 0.229* 0.166
(0.0671) (0.0832) (0.0720) (0.0924) (0.135) (0.141)
inflation −0.0349 −0.0216 −0.0932 0.00697 0.0558 0.00295
(0.0790) (0.0891) (0.0827) (0.0926) (0.134) (0.127)
gdp pc 0.0254* 0.0250* 0.0123 0.0343** 0.0393** 0.0252*
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0136)
d NA Australasia −2.227*** −2.363*** −1.960** −1.838** −2.209*** −1.978**
(0.821) (0.777) (0.831) (0.881) (0.819) (0.944)
d South Europe 0.261 0.0578 0.0643 0.472 0.369 0.210
(0.489) (0.514) (0.342) (0.499) (0.565) (0.403)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.154 −0.265 −0.414 0.0515 0.0634 −0.111
(0.439) (0.462) (0.346) (0.505) (0.601) (0.500)
d Asia −2.165*** −2.345*** −2.525*** −1.739** −1.872** −2.071***
(0.750) (0.695) (0.628) (0.746) (0.748) (0.608)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves 0.00597 −0.00863 0.00605
(0.0113) (0.0408) (0.0117)
credit gdp 0.00794 0.00823 0.00533
(0.00655) (0.00881) (0.00689)
L2.credit growth −0.00210 −0.00311 2.118
(0.0268) (0.0319) (4.394)
L.topincomep99 26.53*** 28.68***
(7.930) (9.440)
L2.topincomep99 26.94*** 33.42***
(7.949) (11.19)
L3.topincomep99 15.07*** 23.42***
(5.719) (8.825)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.81 96.77 96.43 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 13.33 13.33 6.667 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.255 0.267 0.208 0.267 0.290 0.227
Chi−sq 32.84 34.14 26.46 30.77 33.34 26.08
p−value 0.00180 0.00114 0.0147 0.0144 0.00665 0.0529
AIC 119.7 117.9 124.9 114.6 111.7 118.6
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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variables to control for unobservable time effects. In the Appendix we show the results for the Gini index
and top 1% income share including both region- and decade- (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) fixed effects. The
estimated coefficient of the Gini index is insignificant for all lags in the baseline specification in Table A4 in
the Appendix. However, the estimated Gini coefficients are positive and significant at the 10% level in the
extended model. Moreover, the coefficient for the top 1% income share is generally highly significant in both
the baseline and extended model shown in Table A5.
Furthermore, to test the robustness of the results for the top 1% income share, we re-estimate the
baseline and extended specification for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares, including regional fixed
effects. Table A6 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients for top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares are
positive and highly significant.
4.3.3 Estimation on selected subsamples
To test whether the significance of the results depends on a specific region, we estimate the extended model
with one lag for the Gini index and the top 1% income share excluding one region at a time. The Gini
index is significant when excluding any of the six different regions shown in Table A7. However, the results
are only significant at the 10% level when excluding North America and Australasia or Western Europe.
Moreover, the coefficient for the top 1% income share is significant under the exclusion of any region with
the exception of North America and Australasia or Western Europe, as shown in Table A8.
4.3.4 Alternative total credit definitions
Bordo and Meissner (2012) argue that domestic bank credit may not be a a good proxy for total credit
if substantial amounts of credit are provided by non-bank institutions. For example, in the United States
banks only account for 30% of total credit, while bank credit in countries like Germany or Greece can be
around 90% of total credit (Dembiermont, Drehmann and Muksakunratana, 2013). Table A3 shows that
the median level of total credit as a percentage of GDP is 117% compared to 69% for domestic bank credit.
Consequently, the specifications are re-estimated including a measure for total credit which may also include
cross-border credit and domestic credit from other financial institutions.
Table A9 in the Appendix shows the results for the Gini index and the top 1% income shares including
the broader measure of total credit. Both the Gini index and the top 1% income share (columns 1 and 4) are
highly statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for the level of total credit (as a percentage
of GDP) is positive and significant, while that of the growth rate of total credit is statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, Perugini, Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) consider aggregate measures of credit that include
both household credit (the relevant type of credit according to the literature) and credit to firms. Moreover,
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the average correlation between the real growth rate in firm and household credit is only 40% across countries
(Dembiermont, Drehmann and Muksakunratana, 2013). Columns 2-3 and 5-6 in Table A9 show the results
for estimations including household and firm credit separately. The Gini index and the top 1% income share
are both positive and highly statistically significant when including household or firm credit. Interestingly,
both the level of household credit to GDP and the lagged growth rate of household credit are highly significant
in the specifications that include the Gini index (column 2). However, both the level and growth rate of firm
credit are not significant in any specification (columns 3 and 6). This result is consistent with the findings by
Bu¨yu¨kkarabacak and Valev (2010). Consequently, household credit seems to be more important for financial
stability compared to firm credit.
4.3.5 Lagged control variables
For the results presented in the previous Section all control variables except credit growth are contempo-
raneous, which may lead to endogeneity issues. To check if the coefficients are influenced by endogeneity
we lag all control variables one period. Table A10 shows that the coefficients for the Gini index are highly
significant when all control variables are lagged one period in the baseline specification. In addition, Table
A11 shows that the significance of the top 1% income share is robust to lagging the control variables one
period.
Among the lagged control variables, the coefficients of GDP per capita and the change in terms of trade
typically remain positive and significant. The level of credit to GDP is highly significant and positive in all
estimations with the Gini index. This finding reinforces the importance of the level of credit to GDP as a
determinant of banking crises.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the growth rate of GDP switches to a positive sign and is highly significant
as shown in Table A10. Consequently, the negative estimated coefficient of contemporaneous GDP growth
shown in Tables 7 and 8 may be a consequence of the onset of the banking crisis rather than a cause of the
crisis. Furthermore, the coefficient of nominal depreciation is not significant when lagged one period, which
once again may be a consequence of endogeneity. In addition, the real interest rate becomes significant and
positive when lagged one period, contrary to previous results.
4.3.6 Alternative robust standard errors
Logit estimations with robust standard errors that are not clustered by country are shown in Table A12.
The coefficient estimates for the Gini index in the baseline and extended model remain significant. More-
over, Table A13 shows that the coefficients for the Gini index are also positive and significant for probit
regressions. In addition, the sign and significance of the critical coefficients seem quite stable with respect
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to the omission/inclusion of the additional regressors.
4.3.7 Including measures of the quality of institutions and market conditions
It is important to control for the quality of institutions and market regulations across countries. Estimations
including regulation indices from the Fraser Institute in the Economic Freedom of the World database can
be found in the Appendix (see Tables A14-A16). All regulation indexes take values between 0 and 10, and
a higher number implies more deregulation. The credit regulation index (code 5A) is a summary measure
of (i) ownership of banks (ii) foreign bank competition (iii) private sector credit and (iv) interest rates
controls/negative interest rates.
Furthermore, it is important to account for the institutional setting of labor and product markets. Labor
market regulation (code 5B) includes information about (i) hiring regulations for temporary workers and
minimum wage, (ii) hiring and firing regulations, (iii) centralized collective bargaining, (iv) hours regulation
and (v) conscription and mandated costs of dismissal. In addition, the business regulation index encompasses
information on (i) price controls, (ii) administrative requirements, (iii) bureaucracy costs, (iv) time and
money required to start a business, (v) extra payments or bribes, (vi) licensing costs and (vii) cost of tax
compliance. These measures have been used previously in the empirical literature for example by Perugini,
Ho¨lscher and Collie (2016) and Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2011).
Table A14 reports results from Logit estimations including each regulation index separately and all
together. First, we can see that the coefficients for both the Gini index and the top 1% income share are
positive and significant in all estimations. Second, the business regulation index (business reg) is negative and
highly significant, while the credit regulation index (credit reg) and the labor regulation index (labour reg)
are not. These findings suggest that a more deregulated product market seems to lower the probability of
banking crises. To conclude, the previous finding that the Gini index and top 1% income share are positively
associated with the likelihood of banking crises seems robust with respect to the inclusion of regulation
indices for credit, labor and product markets.
According to Piketty and Saez (2013), a booming stock market both increases top income shares (via
higher capital gains) and enhances financial fragility. Stock market conditions are proxied by a share price
index collected from the OECD database. If the contemporaneous level of the share price index is included,
its coefficient is insignificant. Moreover, the contemporaneous coefficient for the growth rate of the share
price index is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is expected since banking crises often
coincide with a collapse in stock prices.
Tables A15 and A16 show results for the top 1% income share when the level and growth rate of the share
price index are lagged one period. The lagged coefficients for both the level and growth rate of the share
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price index and the top 1% income share are positive and typically significant. In short, results suggest that
the positive association between the top 1% income share and the likelihood of banking crises previously
found is not simply a correlation caused by a booming stock market.
5 Conclusions
This paper is one of the first to empirically investigate whether the level of income inequality is directly
linked to the occurrence of banking crises. Previous empirical literature examining the “level” hypothesis
either used descriptive statistics (for example Atkinson and Morelli, 2015), or investigated the indirect link
between income inequality and banking crises via the level of credit in the economy (Perugini, Ho¨lscher and
Collie, 2016).
We conduct an econometric analysis based on logit regressions to estimate the relationship between the
level of the Gini index or top 1% income shares (both before taxes and transfers) and banking crises. Using
a panel dataset of 33 advanced countries over the period 1970-2011, we find strong evidence for a positive
association between the probability of banking crises and the level of income inequality. In addition, the
results successfully pass a battery of robustness tests, such as for example the inclusion of the level and
growth rate of domestic bank credit and the exclusion of various groups of countries.
Furthermore, we find that the effect of an increase in the level of inequality on the probability of the
occurrence of a banking crisis is relatively large in economic terms, and that the size of the effect seems to
increase with the level of income inequality.
Although income inequality could influence the probability of a banking crisis through several channels,
to set up a fully-fledged theoretical model supporting our empirical findings goes beyond the scope of this
paper.11
A possible mechanism, consistent with our empirical findings, that links income inequality and banking
crises is the following. Persistently high levels of (before-tax) income inequality may induce policy makers
to increase redistribution through large public expenditure and taxation mechanisms like those pioneered by
Meltzer and Richard (1981), and later extended to growth by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994). Worsening public deficits and debts (and rising interest rates), such policies may depress
growth and ultimately deteriorate banks stability.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that almost all biggest economies of our samples display a positive
association between persistently high levels of income inequality and the occurrence of banking crises. Insofar
as high levels of income inequality are associated to banking crises in large economies, inequality should be
11With the exception of Kumhof, Ranciere and Winant (2015), we are not aware of theoretical contributions displaying a neat
relationship between income inequality and financial crises. Kirschenmann, Malinen and Nyberg (2016) discuss the literature
and describe some of these channels.
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taken very seriously at the international level as financial integration might easily give rise to epidemic
contagion worldwide.
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Table A1: Definitions and sources of main variables
Variable Definition Source
crisis A binary variable equal to 1
in the first year of a banking
crisis, 0 otherwise.
Laeven and Valencia (2013).
gini gross Market Gini index pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
Standard World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID) version 5.1.
topincomep99 The income share of top 1%
pre-tax and pre-transfer
World Top Incomes Database.
gdp growth Growth rate of real GDP. World Bank WDI.
totchange Change in terms of trade. World Bank WDI.
realinterest Nominal interest rate minus
contemporaneous inflation.
The nominal interest rate is from IFS: (i) trea-
sure bill rate or (ii) discount/bank rate or (iii)
the deposit rate. The GDP deflator based In-
flation is from World Bank WDI.
inflation Rate of change of GDP defla-
tor.
World Bank WDI.
m2 reserves Ratio of M2 to international
reserves.
M2 (money plus quasi-money in local cur-
rency) that is converted to US$ and divided
by total foreign exchange reserves of the cen-
tral bank. All data is from IMF IFS.
depreciation Rate of depreciation. USD/LCU exchange rate (IMF IFS).
gdp1 pc Real GDP per capita. Constant 1995 in thousands of US$ (World
Bank WDI).
credit gdp Ratio of private sector bank
credit to GDP.
Adjusted domestic bank credit to the private
non-financial sector divided by GDP (BIS to-
tal credit statistics). Otherwise depository
corporations domestic claims on private sector
(IMF IFS) divided by nominal GDP (World
Bank WDI). All in LCU.
credit growth Growth rate of real domestic
bank credit to the private sec-
tor.
Adjusted domestic bank credit to the private
non-financial sector (BIS total credit statis-
tics), otherwise depository corporations do-
mestic claims on private sector (IMF IFS);
divided by the GDP deflator (World Bank
WDI). All in LCU.
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Table A2: Definitions and sources of additional variables used in robustness tests
Variable Definition Source
totalcredit gdp Ratio of private sector total credit to
GDP. This variable includes domes-
tic bank credit, cross-border credit
and domestic credit from other fi-
nancial institutions.
Adjusted total credit to the private non-financial
sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit statis-
tics).
totalcredit growth Growth rate of real total credit to
the private sector. This variable in-
cludes domestic bank credit, cross-
border credit and domestic credit
from other financial institutions.
Adjusted total credit to the private non-financial
sector (BIS total credit statistics); divided by the
GDP deflator (World Bank WDI). All in LCU.
hhcredit gdp Ratio of private sector household
credit to GDP.
Adjusted household credit to the private non-
financial sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit
statistics).
hhcredit growth Growth rate of real household credit
to the private sector.
Adjusted household credit to the private non-
financial sector (BIS total credit statistics); di-
vided by the GDP deflator (World Bank WDI).
All in LCU.
firmcredit gdp Ratio of private sector firm credit to
GDP.
Adjusted firm credit to the private non-financial
sector divided by GDP (BIS total credit statis-
tics).
firmcredit growth Growth rate of real firm credit to the
private sector.
Adjusted firm credit to the private non-financial
sector (BIS total credit statistics); divided by the
GDP deflator (World Bank WDI). All in LCU.
credit reg Credit regulation index taking val-
ues from 0 to 10. A higher number
implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
labor reg Labor market regulation index tak-
ing values from 0 to 10. A higher
number implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
business reg Business regulation index taking
values from 0 to 10. A higher num-
ber implies more deregulation.
Economic Freedom of the World database (Fraser
institute).
house index Real house price index OECD
share index Share price index OECD
topincomep999 The income share of top 0.1% pre-
tax and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
topincomep95 The income share of top 5% pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
topincomep90 The income share of top 10% pre-tax
and pre-transfer.
World Top Incomes Database.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Bank crisis 0.09 0 0.15 0 1 1386
Market Gini index 43.41 44.20 6.08 24.47 58.59 1040
Top 0.1% income share 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12 595
Top 1% income share 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.23 662
Top 5% income share 0.21 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.37 665
Top 10% income share 0.32 0.31 0.05 0.19 0.47 659
GDP growth 3.35 3.21 3.41 -14.81 16.16 1217
Change in terms of trade 1.20×1012 0 6.82×1012 -3.26×1013 6.97×1013 1201
Depreciation 7.88 -0.06 257.10 -99.29 7533.67 861
Real interest rate 1.25 1.35 3.97 -19.43 20.11 745
Inflation 7.24 4.02 16.87 -9.69 390.68 1217
GDP per capita 31381.71 29192 16752.88 1960.36 110001.1 1227
Ratio M2 to Inter. Res. 123602.6 66.84 2130872 0.90 4.22×107 623
Credit to GDP 76.58 68.58 34.37 20.7 312.12 1071
Credit growth 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.21 0.60 1032
Total credit to GDP 123.21 117.43 49.51 29.3 421.43 1043
Total credit growth 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.13 0.78 999
Household credit to GDP 50.12 46.89 24.52 5.93 137.95 774
Household credit growth 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.20 0.61 747
Firm credit to GDP 83.73 79.58 36.17 26.13 369.23 752
Firm credit growth 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.15 0.92 730
Credit regulation index 8.72 9.26 1.50 0 10 566
Labour regulation index 5.97 5.7 1.70 2.62 9.46 529
Business regulation index 6.79 6.78 0.92 3.91 9.5 424
Real house price index 75.17 72.18 31.18 24.10 188.54 890
Share price index 66.19 47.82 78.37 0.01 1246.92 947
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Table A4: Results for Gini index including regional and period dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.191*** −0.191*** −0.191*** −0.364*** −0.378*** −0.374***
(0.0664) (0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0794) (0.0800) (0.0818)
totchange 0.0570*** 0.0565*** 0.0546*** 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.143***
(0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0482) (0.0502) (0.0481)
depreciation −0.0661*** −0.0661*** −0.0659*** −0.0832*** −0.0818*** −0.0822***
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0229) (0.0227) (0.0246)
realinterest 0.0352 0.0397 0.0366 0.0470 0.0566 0.0363
(0.0965) (0.0949) (0.0989) (0.187) (0.182) (0.208)
inflation 0.101 0.104 0.103 −0.0653 −0.0553 −0.0559
(0.0769) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0939) (0.0963) (0.0978)
gdp pc 0.0227** 0.0228** 0.0225** 0.0671** 0.0681** 0.0661**
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0289)
d NA Australasia −1.012 −1.032 −1.055 −0.333 −0.319 −0.332
(1.073) (1.098) (1.097) (1.050) (1.069) (1.015)
d South Europe 0.106 0.104 0.109 0.885 0.902 0.814
(0.501) (0.514) (0.506) (0.577) (0.570) (0.555)
d East Europe −0.00757 −0.0270 −0.0283 − − −
(0.953) (0.959) (0.955) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.655 −0.644 −0.681 −0.847 −0.880 −0.850
(0.435) (0.450) (0.456) (0.743) (0.783) (0.763)
d Asia −1.363 −1.367 −1.402* −1.685** −1.757** −1.926***
(0.857) (0.846) (0.839) (0.751) (0.715) (0.710)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d 1980s 13.24*** 13.66*** 13.81*** 271.2 290.0 16.15***
(1.235) (1.183) (1.197) (344.9) (378.2) (2.275)
d 1990s 14.91*** 15.34*** 15.38*** 269.6 288.7 14.39***
(1.153) (1.297) (1.252) (344.0) (377.3) (1.172)
d 2000s 14.66*** 15.07*** 15.09*** 269.7 288.7 14.44***
(1.127) (1.253) (1.208) (344.0) (377.3) (0.829)
m2 reserves 0.00170 0.00100 0.00279
(0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0329)
credit gdp 0.0136** 0.0141** 0.0157**
(0.00675) (0.00640) (0.00702)
L2.credit growth 3.393 3.636 2.975
(4.403) (4.831) (4.570)
L.gini market 0.0514 0.203*
(0.0513) (0.108)
L2.gini market 0.0519 0.211*
(0.0523) (0.112)
L3.gini market 0.0459 0.208*
(0.0532) (0.107)
Observations 588 575 566 403 399 392
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 96.26 96.17 96.11 95.78 95.99 95.92
% Crises Correct 8.333 8.333 8.333 20 20 20
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 99.74 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.230 0.229 0.227 0.331 0.333 0.335
Chi−sq 46.17 45.67 45.13 52.69 52.83 52.89
p−value 9.16e−05 0.000110 0.000133 5.22e−05 4.97e−05 4.87e−05
AIC 186.4 185.8 185.5 142.4 141.9 141.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Results for top 1% income share including regional and period dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.335** −0.306** −0.333** −0.304*** −0.253** −0.298**
(0.135) (0.146) (0.149) (0.111) (0.119) (0.131)
totchange 0.0936*** 0.104*** 0.0775** 0.0970*** 0.118*** 0.0827**
(0.0222) (0.0193) (0.0340) (0.0326) (0.0311) (0.0346)
depreciation −0.0550*** −0.0608*** −0.0494*** −0.0684*** −0.0827*** −0.0688**
(0.0158) (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0239) (0.0230) (0.0273)
realinterest 0.126 0.127 0.109 0.166 0.189 0.176
(0.0854) (0.0967) (0.0999) (0.119) (0.140) (0.137)
inflation −0.0130 0.0111 −0.0250 −0.0492 −0.0179 0.00851
(0.140) (0.148) (0.167) (0.109) (0.132) (0.143)
gdp pc 0.0207 0.0194 0.00718 0.0331* 0.0379** 0.0251*
(0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0145) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0134)
d NA Australasia −2.056*** −2.244*** −1.856* −1.763* −2.203*** −1.652*
(0.759) (0.741) (0.948) (0.901) (0.849) (0.935)
d South Europe 0.271 0.0888 0.0461 0.500 0.407 0.421
(0.566) (0.607) (0.410) (0.600) (0.660) (0.413)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 0.0139 −0.0503 −0.206 0.0782 0.105 0.164
(0.489) (0.532) (0.288) (0.643) (0.730) (0.492)
d Asia −2.051*** −2.237*** −2.251*** −1.845** −2.036*** −1.992***
(0.719) (0.678) (0.701) (0.731) (0.700) (0.723)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d 1980s 13.62*** 13.10*** 14.94*** 91.41 59.82 24.42*
(1.920) (1.931) (2.668) (471.4) (438.8) (14.52)
d 1990s 14.28*** 13.97*** 16.12*** 90.37 58.58 23.88
(1.115) (1.135) (1.307) (471.1) (438.7) (15.07)
d 2000s 14.19*** 13.74*** 16.11*** 90.76 58.86 24.31
(0.800) (0.872) (1.102) (471.2) (438.8) (15.01)
m2 reserves 0.00855 −0.0248 0.0703
(0.0832) (0.0693) (0.0709)
credit gdp 0.00808 0.00927 0.00764
(0.00888) (0.0109) (0.00702)
L2.credit growth 1.061 0.660 −1.044
(6.023) (5.611) (4.391)
L.topincomep99 24.44*** 28.05***
(7.838) (9.753)
L2.topincomep99 25.91*** 33.96***
(8.567) (12.05)
L3.topincomep99 13.60* 23.31**
(7.107) (9.947)
Observations 408 402 392 324 321 317
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.81 96.77 96.43 96.30 96.26 95.90
% Crises Correct 13.33 13.33 6.667 14.29 14.29 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.266 0.279 0.229 0.281 0.304 0.247
Chi−sq 34.23 35.78 29.12 32.42 34.97 28.31
p−value 0.00506 0.00311 0.0231 0.0280 0.0141 0.0776
AIC 124.3 122.3 114.2 118.9 116.1 122.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Results for the top 0.1%, 5% and 10% income shares including regional dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.296** −0.250*** −0.324*** −0.263** −0.224** −0.298***
(0.144) (0.0943) (0.120) (0.127) (0.0902) (0.114)
totchange 0.0865*** 0.0952*** 0.102*** 0.0776** 0.0921*** 0.101***
(0.0184) (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0328) (0.0174) (0.0215)
depreciation −0.0578*** −0.0573*** −0.0567*** −0.0783** −0.0725*** −0.0675***
(0.0201) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0336) (0.0239) (0.0222)
realinterest 0.150** 0.122* 0.0895 0.241** 0.175* 0.140*
(0.0732) (0.0653) (0.0607) (0.0951) (0.0941) (0.0833)
inflation 0.00115 0.00646 −0.0657 0.0759 0.0426 −0.0353
(0.0843) (0.0780) (0.0770) (0.0846) (0.0822) (0.0967)
gdp pc 0.0166 0.0376** 0.0333* 0.0214 0.0497*** 0.0478**
(0.0119) (0.0173) (0.0182) (0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0209)
d NA Australasia −2.281** −1.738** −1.624** −1.850* −1.478* −1.274
(0.938) (0.739) (0.816) (1.009) (0.837) (0.888)
d South Europe 0.431 0.340 0.181 0.524 0.565 0.494
(0.451) (0.542) (0.555) (0.578) (0.552) (0.600)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.284 −0.423 −0.0113 −0.0507 −0.197 0.264
(0.354) (0.659) (0.477) (0.403) (0.839) (0.640)
d Asia −1.717** −2.099*** −2.623*** −1.233 −1.838*** −2.403***
(0.705) (0.643) (0.625) (0.909) (0.649) (0.665)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
m2 reserves −0.0208 0.00277 0.00692
(0.144) (0.0156) (0.0101)
credit gdp 0.00812 0.00804 0.00721
(0.00787) (0.00902) (0.00758)
L2.credit growth −0.0122 −0.00374 0.0156
(0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0266)
L.topincomep999 47.83*** 49.65***
(14.31) (13.16)
L.topincomep95 16.25*** 20.38**
(5.999) (8.681)
L.topincomep90 12.47** 15.91**
(5.660) (8.006)
Observations 366 410 408 287 326 324
No. crises 13 14 15 12 13 14
% Total Correct 96.72 96.83 96.81 96.17 96.32 96.30
% Crises Correct 7.692 7.143 13.33 8.333 7.692 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.241 0.208 0.234 0.250 0.224 0.249
Chi−sq 27.05 25.41 30.08 24.91 24.44 28.67
p−value 0.0123 0.0204 0.00459 0.0715 0.0804 0.0263
AIC 109.3 120.7 122.5 102.8 114.8 116.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Results for Gini index, excluding one region at a time
Excluding
NA-
Australasia
Excluding
South Eu-
rope
Excluding
East Europe
Excluding
Nordic
Excluding
Asia
Excluding
Western
Europe
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.286*** −0.264*** −0.334*** −0.295*** −0.240*** −0.209***
(0.0687) (0.0659) (0.0707) (0.0789) (0.0708) (0.0624)
totchange 0.0689** 0.145*** 0.0883*** 0.0997*** −2.459 0.0813**
(0.0317) (0.0445) (0.0199) (0.0287) (2.838) (0.0325)
depreciation −0.104*** −0.0929*** −0.0853*** −0.0821*** −0.0740*** −0.112***
(0.0253) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0206) (0.0214) (0.0259)
realinterest 0.0287 0.219*** 0.0851 −0.118 0.0366 0.143
(0.152) (0.0750) (0.105) (0.143) (0.129) (0.151)
inflation 0.00762 0.0535 0.0412 0.0177 −0.0212 0.0595
(0.0545) (0.0646) (0.0544) (0.0975) (0.0692) (0.130)
gdp pc 0.0438** 0.0913*** 0.0491*** 0.0582*** 0.0437*** 0.0470***
(0.0173) (0.0292) (0.0105) (0.0173) (0.0120) (0.00993)
m2 reserves 0.0199 −0.0430 0.0119 0.00781 0.0125 0.0197**
(0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0108) (0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0100)
credit gdp 0.0136** 0.00912 0.0118** 0.0141** 0.0154** 0.00922
(0.00606) (0.00580) (0.00488) (0.00631) (0.00677) (0.00621)
L2.credit growth 0.00611 −0.00959 0.0270 0.0285 1.595 0.0134
(0.0428) (0.598) (0.0196) (0.0193) (3.120) (0.0314)
L.gini market 0.152* 0.246*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 0.212*** 0.185*
(0.0824) (0.0895) (0.0565) (0.0726) (0.0651) (0.112)
Observations 300 378 403 368 322 314
No. crises 18 16 20 17 18 11
% Total Correct 95 97.09 96.28 96.20 95.65 97.13
% Crises Correct 27.78 31.25 25 17.65 22.22 18.18
% No−Crises Correct 99.29 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.302 0.316 0.281 0.284 0.241 0.305
Chi−sq 41.10 41.88 44.68 39.12 33.41 29.09
p−value 1.08e−05 7.87e−06 2.48e−06 2.42e−05 0.000233 0.00120
AIC 117.1 112.6 136.4 120.6 127.4 88.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A8: Results for top 1% income share, excluding one region at a time
Excluding
NA-
Australasia
Excluding
South Eu-
rope
Excluding
East Europe
Excluding
Nordic
Excluding
Asia
Excluding
Western
Europe
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.359*** −0.249** −0.275*** −0.264** −0.273** −0.215*
(0.0973) (0.0981) (0.0913) (0.105) (0.115) (0.123)
totchange 0.0529*** 0.0657*** 0.0583*** 0.0594*** −1.577 0.0631**
(0.0172) (0.0144) (0.0108) (0.0113) (2.333) (0.0291)
depreciation −0.0863*** −0.0720*** −0.0727*** −0.0665*** −0.0478** −0.101***
(0.0311) (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0306)
realinterest 0.204* 0.182* 0.155 0.0656 0.0932 0.191
(0.106) (0.0978) (0.0998) (0.122) (0.126) (0.136)
inflation 0.0663 0.0138 0.0233 0.0242 −0.0610 0.0189
(0.0690) (0.0974) (0.0863) (0.0901) (0.124) (0.119)
gdp pc 0.0396*** 0.0502*** 0.0426*** 0.0420** 0.0283* 0.0508***
(0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0117) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0179)
m2 reserves 0.0108 0.00518 0.00229 0.00368 −0.00716 −0.0291
(0.0613) (0.00964) (0.0101) (0.00978) (0.0248) (0.117)
credit gdp 0.0133 0.0132* 0.0159* 0.0198** 0.0144 0.0168
(0.0105) (0.00801) (0.00826) (0.00994) (0.00881) (0.0165)
L2.credit growth −0.00711 −0.0282 −0.00640 −0.00783 3.268 −0.00916
(0.0250) (0.0809) (0.0198) (0.0183) (4.705) (0.0269)
L.topincomep99 22.56 19.62*** 19.55*** 23.93*** 18.92** 17.22
(19.02) (7.604) (7.405) (9.287) (8.095) (10.79)
Observations 202 299 324 287 251 257
No. crises 12 12 14 12 12 8
% Total Correct 95.05 96.66 96.30 96.52 95.62 96.89
% Crises Correct 16.67 16.67 14.29 16.67 8.333 12.50
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 99.60
Pseudo R−sq 0.246 0.232 0.223 0.238 0.179 0.263
Chi−sq 22.41 23.31 25.74 23.75 17.22 18.71
p−value 0.0131 0.00966 0.00411 0.00828 0.0697 0.0441
AIC 90.62 99.38 111.6 97.93 101.2 74.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A9: Income inequality and different measures of credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.307*** −0.324*** −0.322*** −0.237** −0.279*** −0.251***
(0.0732) (0.0709) (0.0730) (0.101) (0.0982) (0.0846)
totchange 0.0746*** 0.0832*** 0.0748*** 0.0517*** 0.0613*** 0.0472***
(0.0222) (0.0216) (0.0232) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0149)
depreciation −0.0815*** −0.0878*** −0.0844*** −0.0789*** −0.0855*** −0.0898***
(0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0211) (0.0226)
realinterest 0.0557 0.0686 0.0357 0.156 0.128 0.128
(0.122) (0.118) (0.107) (0.104) (0.0903) (0.0862)
inflation 0.0124 −0.0176 −0.0549 0.0191 −0.0521 −0.0563
(0.0640) (0.0704) (0.0683) (0.0926) (0.0804) (0.0948)
gdp pc 0.0243 0.0416*** 0.0386** 0.0302** 0.0437*** 0.0446**
(0.0151) (0.00867) (0.0178) (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0210)
m2 reserves 0.00626 0.0151* 0.00919 −0.00272 0.00353 0.00192
(0.0206) (0.00904) (0.0136) (0.0228) (0.00845) (0.0117)
totalcredit gdp 0.0105** 0.0193**
(0.00515) (0.00945)
L2.totalcredit growth 0.00926 −0.0110
(0.0170) (0.0173)
hhcredit gdp 0.0283*** 0.0270*
(0.00907) (0.0157)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0532** 0.0171
(0.0239) (0.0292)
firmcredit gdp 0.00270 0.0156
(0.00592) (0.0101)
L2.firmcredit growth 0.000698 −0.00740
(0.0272) (0.0132)
L.gini market 0.154*** 0.140** 0.132**
(0.0528) (0.0544) (0.0567)
L.topincomep99 17.03*** 9.210** 16.34***
(5.132) (4.068) (6.145)
Observations 409 388 372 324 298 289
No. crises 19 19 19 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.33 95.88 95.70 96.30 95.97 95.85
% Crises Correct 21.05 15.79 15.79 14.29 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.256 0.271 0.234 0.236 0.241 0.229
Chi−sq 39.39 41.05 35.14 27.20 27.22 25.66
p−value 2.17e−05 1.11e−05 0.000118 0.00242 0.00240 0.00422
AIC 136.3 132.6 136.9 110.2 107.7 108.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A10: Gini index, all control variables are lagged 1 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.260** 0.236** 0.220**
(0.0513) (0.0521) (0.0513) (0.103) (0.0989) (0.0989)
L.totchange 0.0888*** 0.0899*** 0.0872*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.148***
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0374) (0.0395) (0.0391)
L.depreciation −0.0215 −0.0226 −0.0233 −0.0478 −0.0506 −0.0503
(0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0342)
L.realinterest 0.178** 0.181** 0.186** 0.378*** 0.407*** 0.423***
(0.0831) (0.0815) (0.0804) (0.102) (0.120) (0.130)
L.inflation 0.101 0.103 0.110 0.0488 0.0614 0.0742
(0.0729) (0.0733) (0.0718) (0.104) (0.108) (0.109)
L.gdp pc 0.0343*** 0.0345*** 0.0343*** 0.0687** 0.0705** 0.0716**
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0283) (0.0303) (0.0307)
d NA Australasia −1.366 −1.339 −1.323 −0.834 −0.879 −0.807
(1.053) (1.038) (1.022) (1.280) (1.293) (1.220)
d South Europe 0.376 0.340 0.319 1.861*** 1.871*** 1.879***
(0.823) (0.833) (0.829) (0.586) (0.576) (0.566)
d East Europe 0.409 0.443 0.468 − − −
(0.752) (0.751) (0.732) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.539 −0.529 −0.558 −0.706 −0.897 −0.971
(0.525) (0.531) (0.541) (0.549) (0.637) (0.700)
d Asia −2.017 −2.040 −2.032 −2.163* −2.253* −2.293*
(1.250) (1.277) (1.291) (1.243) (1.284) (1.314)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
L.m2 reserves −0.0188 −0.0198 −0.0196
(0.0269) (0.0289) (0.0290)
L.credit gdp 0.0156*** 0.0164*** 0.0168***
(0.00399) (0.00411) (0.00438)
L.credit growth −4.416 −4.813 −4.969
(3.428) (3.650) (3.824)
L.gini market 0.0892** 0.184**
(0.0369) (0.0922)
L2.gini market 0.0939** 0.173**
(0.0378) (0.0874)
L3.gini market 0.0891** 0.172**
(0.0406) (0.0787)
Observations 569 563 550 391 386 379
No. crises 24 24 24 20 20 20
% Total Correct 95.96 95.91 95.82 95.65 95.60 95.51
% Crises Correct 4.167 4.167 4.167 15 15 15
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.145 0.147 0.145 0.270 0.272 0.274
Chi−sq 28.92 29.16 28.63 42.60 42.80 42.84
p−value 0.00671 0.00620 0.00739 0.000321 0.000300 0.000296
AIC 196 195.2 194.6 145.3 144.6 143.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A11: Top 1% income share, all control variables are lagged 1 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.0837 0.119 0.112 0.224 0.284** 0.267**
(0.0762) (0.0833) (0.0836) (0.138) (0.130) (0.124)
L.totchange 0.0997*** 0.122*** 0.0808** 0.0998*** 0.126*** 0.0895**
(0.0162) (0.0203) (0.0359) (0.0162) (0.0220) (0.0377)
L.depreciation −0.0261 −0.0217 −0.0298 −0.0363 −0.0324 −0.0356
(0.0342) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0373) (0.0366) (0.0359)
L.realinterest 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.218** 0.462*** 0.426*** 0.418***
(0.0967) (0.0924) (0.0889) (0.150) (0.127) (0.129)
L.inflation 0.0718 0.0972 0.0510 0.172 0.181 0.186
(0.0741) (0.0774) (0.0796) (0.132) (0.125) (0.143)
L.gdp pc 0.0408* 0.0394* 0.0331* 0.0395* 0.0365 0.0350*
(0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0198) (0.0217) (0.0233) (0.0197)
d NA Australasia −2.383*** −2.585*** −2.138*** −1.867** −2.096** −1.929**
(0.725) (0.674) (0.756) (0.877) (0.833) (0.923)
d South Europe 1.012 0.898 1.056** 1.611* 1.425 1.535**
(0.621) (0.669) (0.532) (0.946) (0.960) (0.767)
d East Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
d Nordic −0.715 −0.758 −0.888 0.405 0.372 0.274
(0.890) (0.907) (0.758) (0.846) (0.887) (0.718)
d Asia −2.191** −2.723** −2.377** −2.153** −2.907** −2.614**
(0.933) (1.222) (0.989) (0.911) (1.418) (1.332)
d Western Europe − − − − − −
(−) (−) (−) (−) (−) (−)
L.m2 reserves 0.0134 0.00854 0.0125
(0.0146) (0.0183) (0.0127)
L.credit gdp 0.0203* 0.0173 0.0183**
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.00911)
L.credit growth −6.574 −6.676 −6.627
(5.588) (5.405) (5.076)
L.topincomep99 27.09*** 33.02***
(7.588) (9.172)
L2.topincomep99 30.73*** 35.90***
(9.277) (10.78)
L3.topincomep99 20.55** 30.57***
(8.221) (10.77)
Observations 395 392 386 316 314 307
No. crises 15 15 15 14 14 14
% Total Correct 96.20 96.43 96.11 96.20 96.50 95.77
% Crises Correct 0 6.667 0 14.29 21.43 7.143
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.192 0.216 0.154 0.235 0.255 0.208
Chi−sq 24.49 27.52 19.56 26.92 29.16 23.71
p−value 0.0269 0.0106 0.107 0.0423 0.0229 0.0961
AIC 127.1 123.8 131.3 117.7 115.3 120.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A12: Logit results for income inequality, robust S.E. (not clustered by country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.181*** −0.265*** −0.324*** −0.308*** −0.275*** −0.279***
(0.0508) (0.0579) (0.0718) (0.0953) (0.0881) (0.0967)
totchange 0.0622*** 0.0845*** 0.0832*** 0.0630*** 0.0583*** 0.0613***
(0.0171) (0.0254) (0.0286) (0.0177) (0.0192) (0.0206)
depreciation −0.0739*** −0.0885*** −0.0878*** −0.0689*** −0.0727*** −0.0855***
(0.0178) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0213)
realinterest 0.0306 0.0616 0.0686 0.0823 0.155 0.128
(0.0766) (0.121) (0.128) (0.0859) (0.117) (0.123)
inflation 0.0664 0.0311 −0.0176 −0.0692 0.0233 −0.0521
(0.0663) (0.0751) (0.0923) (0.0840) (0.101) (0.0996)
gdp pc 0.0293*** 0.0500*** 0.0416*** 0.0369** 0.0426** 0.0437**
(0.00989) (0.0153) (0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0180) (0.0190)
m2 reserves 0.0107 0.0151* 0.00229 0.00353
(0.0140) (0.00866) (0.0101) (0.00894)
credit gdp 0.0123** 0.0159
(0.00618) (0.0122)
L2.credit growth 0.0175 −0.00640
(0.0228) (0.0218)
hhcredit gdp 0.0283** 0.0270
(0.0137) (0.0189)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0532* 0.0171
(0.0278) (0.0323)
L.gini market 0.118** 0.180** 0.140*
(0.0471) (0.0713) (0.0792)
L.topincomep99 12.82 19.55* 9.210
(8.785) (11.77) (7.648)
Observations 588 417 388 408 324 298
No. crises 24 20 19 15 14 14
% Total Correct 96.09 96.40 95.88 96.57 96.30 95.97
% Crises Correct 8.333 25 15.79 6.667 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 99.82 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.178 0.275 0.271 0.195 0.223 0.241
Chi−sq 35.72 44.16 41.05 25.04 25.74 27.22
p−value 8.20e−06 3.08e−06 1.11e−05 0.000748 0.00411 0.00240
AIC 180.8 138.4 132.6 119.5 111.6 107.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A13: Probit results for income inequality, robust S.E. (not clustered by country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.0946*** −0.140*** −0.171*** −0.156*** −0.139*** −0.145***
(0.0272) (0.0353) (0.0445) (0.0507) (0.0493) (0.0539)
totchange 0.0309*** 0.0432*** 0.0402*** 0.0321*** 0.0295*** 0.0302***
(0.00904) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0105)
depreciation −0.0356*** −0.0451*** −0.0471*** −0.0325*** −0.0381*** −0.0458***
(0.00882) (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.00956) (0.0110)
realinterest 0.0263 0.0508 0.0425 0.0427 0.0868 0.0669
(0.0357) (0.0534) (0.0582) (0.0399) (0.0552) (0.0561)
inflation 0.0398 0.0215 −0.00898 −0.0258 0.0137 −0.0236
(0.0301) (0.0369) (0.0423) (0.0390) (0.0450) (0.0444)
gdp pc 0.0147*** 0.0269*** 0.0212*** 0.0186** 0.0221** 0.0214**
(0.00529) (0.00778) (0.00759) (0.00769) (0.00914) (0.00992)
m2 reserves 0.00584 0.00769 0.00111 0.00159
(0.00591) (0.00482) (0.00416) (0.00395)
credit gdp 0.00575* 0.00739
(0.00311) (0.00537)
L2.credit growth 0.0123 −8.97e−05
(0.00899) (0.00891)
hhcredit gdp 0.0144** 0.0133
(0.00654) (0.00863)
L2.hhcredit growth 0.0294** 0.0138
(0.0122) (0.0123)
L.gini market 0.0560*** 0.0857** 0.0630*
(0.0212) (0.0343) (0.0359)
L.topincomep99 6.244 9.160* 4.913
(4.122) (5.161) (3.778)
Observations 588 417 388 408 324 298
No. crises 24 20 19 15 14 14
% Total Correct 96.26 96.16 95.62 96.57 96.30 95.97
% Crises Correct 8.333 20 15.79 6.667 14.29 14.29
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 99.73 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.181 0.275 0.274 0.197 0.224 0.244
Chi−sq 36.29 44.12 41.52 25.36 25.90 27.60
p−value 6.39e−06 3.14e−06 9.13e−06 0.000656 0.00388 0.00209
AIC 180.3 138.4 132.2 119.2 111.5 107.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A14: Extended estimation including credit, labor and business regulation indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
gdp growth −0.252*** −0.254*** −0.271*** −0.301*** −0.316*** −0.310*** −0.301*** −0.302***
(0.0607) (0.0648) (0.0710) (0.0792) (0.0848) (0.0822) (0.112) (0.113)
totchange −0.0754 −0.0761 −0.0792 −0.126** −0.00322 0.0127 −0.0194 −0.0338
(0.0498) (0.0557) (0.0529) (0.0564) (0.0327) (0.0255) (0.0367) (0.0404)
depreciation −0.0872*** −0.0907*** −0.107*** −0.114*** −0.0705*** −0.0696*** −0.0814** −0.0817***
(0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0287) (0.0273) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0319) (0.0296)
realinterest −0.0536 −0.00458 −0.00581 0.0133 0.141 0.129 0.317 0.343
(0.135) (0.111) (0.137) (0.179) (0.120) (0.124) (0.246) (0.239)
inflation −0.0907 −0.0430 −0.0728 −0.0179 0.0170 −0.00247 0.136 0.174
(0.137) (0.115) (0.152) (0.190) (0.123) (0.133) (0.275) (0.265)
gdp pc 0.0529*** 0.0520*** 0.0674*** 0.0739*** 0.0419*** 0.0395** 0.0561** 0.0578**
(0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0161) (0.0180) (0.0229) (0.0226)
credit gdp 0.0138** 0.0134** 0.0197*** 0.0202*** 0.0251* 0.0249* 0.0305** 0.0311**
(0.00631) (0.00654) (0.00744) (0.00718) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0131)
L2.credit growth 4.506 3.926 3.984 3.567 3.724 3.523 −1.194 −1.448
(2.829) (2.720) (3.191) (4.093) (4.816) (4.441) (4.827) (5.351)
credit reg −0.346 0.0308 −0.279 −0.0837
(0.295) (0.382) (0.450) (0.440)
labor reg 0.00596 0.335* −0.122 0.120
(0.149) (0.178) (0.176) (0.242)
business reg −1.299*** −1.681*** −1.485*** −1.597***
(0.302) (0.454) (0.475) (0.542)
L.gini market 0.218** 0.236*** 0.251** 0.288**
(0.0848) (0.0805) (0.102) (0.127)
L.topincomep99 27.17** 28.86** 32.30*** 30.48***
(10.62) (12.01) (8.676) (10.19)
Observations 304 297 270 270 212 204 179 179
No. crises 16 16 16 16 10 10 10 10
% Total Correct 95.39 95.62 95.19 94.81 95.75 95.59 94.97 94.97
% Crises Correct 18.75 25 25 18.75 10 10 10 10
% No−Crises Correct 99.65 99.64 99.61 99.61 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.287 0.276 0.327 0.344 0.259 0.253 0.298 0.301
Chi−sq 36.04 34.39 39.69 41.78 20.88 20.19 23.02 23.22
p−value 8.30e−05 0.000159 1.92e−05 3.63e−05 0.0220 0.0275 0.0107 0.0259
AIC 111.3 112.2 103.8 105.7 81.73 81.62 76.11 79.91
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A15: Estimation with the top 1% income share including the share price index (level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth 0.0102 0.0457 0.0159 −0.0581 −0.00603 0.0387
(0.0878) (0.0915) (0.0910) (0.138) (0.142) (0.130)
L.totchange 0.0648*** 0.0732*** −0.0721* 0.150*** 0.181*** 0.101*
(0.0171) (0.0198) (0.0413) (0.0358) (0.0400) (0.0528)
L.depreciation −0.0265 −0.0260 −0.0240 −0.0142 −0.0114 −0.0207
(0.0291) (0.0291) (0.0253) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0299)
L.realinterest 0.303*** 0.308*** 0.248*** 0.405*** 0.415*** 0.315***
(0.0811) (0.0767) (0.0804) (0.116) (0.104) (0.0843)
L.inflation 0.210** 0.221** 0.181* 0.259* 0.268** 0.229*
(0.0913) (0.0876) (0.0945) (0.139) (0.121) (0.121)
L.gdp pc 0.0412*** 0.0412*** 0.0266** 0.0218 0.0178 0.0118
(0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0133)
L.credit gdp 0.0207* 0.0207** 0.0182** 0.0202* 0.0186* 0.0175*
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.00909) (0.0110) (0.00960) (0.00894)
L2.credit growth −1.540 −1.669 −5.872 −7.285 −7.388 −8.269
(4.757) (4.515) (6.047) (5.286) (4.905) (5.720)
L.share index 0.00990* 0.00950 0.0176** 0.0204*** 0.0212*** 0.0207***
(0.00585) (0.00600) (0.00712) (0.00771) (0.00821) (0.00713)
d NA Australasia −1.533 −1.691* −1.274
(0.971) (0.902) (0.999)
d South Europe 0.718 0.493 0.685
(0.588) (0.648) (0.547)
d East Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 1.213 1.152* 0.919*
(0.746) (0.650) (0.506)
d Asia −3.961*** −4.709*** −3.442***
(1.286) (1.519) (1.217)
d Western Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
L.topincomep99 18.51*** 30.09***
(7.117) (11.15)
L2.topincomep99 20.22** 31.79***
(8.835) (10.97)
L3.topincomep99 11.52 20.67*
(8.438) (10.66)
Observations 340 339 335 340 339 335
No. crises 15 15 15 15 15 15
% Total Correct 95.88 95.87 95.52 95.59 95.87 95.52
% Crises Correct 6.667 6.667 6.667 6.667 13.33 6.667
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 99.69 99.69 99.69 99.69
Pseudo R−sq 0.186 0.197 0.182 0.269 0.292 0.241
Chi−sq 22.92 24.17 22.35 33.12 35.84 29.52
p−value 0.0110 0.00717 0.0134 0.00711 0.00304 0.0206
AIC 122 120.7 122.2 119.8 117 123
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A16: Estimation with the top 1% income share including the share price index (growth rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
L.gdp growth −0.0240 −0.0115 −0.0267 0.0105 0.0319 0.0290
(0.102) (0.0972) (0.0970) (0.123) (0.119) (0.116)
L.totchange 0.0697*** 0.0812*** −0.000384 0.0958*** 0.117*** 0.0417
(0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0344) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0430)
L.depreciation −0.0287 −0.0301 −0.0312 −0.0271 −0.0244 −0.0327
(0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0344)
L.realinterest 0.328*** 0.339*** 0.248*** 0.428*** 0.421*** 0.339***
(0.0982) (0.0958) (0.0845) (0.114) (0.0949) (0.0923)
L.inflation 0.135 0.152 0.0601 0.172 0.184* 0.131
(0.112) (0.104) (0.115) (0.121) (0.104) (0.111)
L.gdp pc 0.0386*** 0.0412*** 0.0232* 0.0335* 0.0306 0.0249
(0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0213) (0.0181)
L.credit gdp 0.0282*** 0.0285*** 0.0270*** 0.0208 0.0189 0.0175*
(0.00982) (0.00907) (0.00894) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0101)
L2.credit growth 2.967 2.635 2.902 1.085 1.406 1.336
(3.758) (3.509) (3.576) (3.807) (3.132) (3.433)
L.share index growth 2.138* 2.480** 3.010** 1.800 2.145* 2.351
(1.199) (1.264) (1.478) (1.389) (1.301) (1.441)
d NA Australasia −1.926** −2.173** −1.758*
(0.925) (0.873) (0.902)
d South Europe 0.937 0.679 0.842
(0.917) (0.971) (0.711)
d East Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
d Nordic 0.174 0.128 −0.178
(0.971) (0.991) (0.769)
d Asia −1.428** −2.047* −1.142***
(0.596) (1.068) (0.408)
d Western Europe − − −
(−) (−) (−)
L.topincomep99 24.34*** 34.16***
(6.465) (9.450)
L2.topincomep99 27.18*** 37.68***
(7.574) (10.06)
L3.topincomep99 20.89*** 27.62***
(8.035) (9.833)
Observations 337 336 332 337 336 332
No. crises 15 15 15 15 15 15
% Total Correct 95.85 96.13 95.78 95.85 96.43 96.08
% Crises Correct 6.667 13.33 6.667 6.667 20 13.33
% No−Crises Correct 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R−sq 0.173 0.189 0.149 0.222 0.246 0.192
Chi−sq 21.20 23.21 18.24 27.25 30.19 23.48
p−value 0.0197 0.00999 0.0510 0.0388 0.0170 0.102
AIC 123.5 121.4 126 125.4 122.4 128.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1. Introduction 
Credit booms have been found to be one of the most robust predictors of financial crises in both 
advanced and developing countries. Schularick and Taylor (2012) show in a study covering 14 countries 
between 1870-2008 that credit booms have been a leading determinant of financial crises. Furthermore, 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find that domestic credit expansion and real currency appreciation have 
been the most significant and robust precursors of financial crises in both advanced and emerging 
countries between 1973 and 2010. In addition, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) confirm that rapidly rising 
private indebtedness is a key predictor of banking crises. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016) show that 
financial stability risk originates in the private sector and not in the public sector in advanced countries. 
Finally, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) find that around one-third of the credit booms in their sample are 
followed by a banking crisis and two-thirds of the booms are succeeded by a banking crisis or below-
trend economic growth. 
There are several theoretical arguments for how the combination of rapid credit growth and financial 
frictions can lead to excessive risk-taking. First, managerial reputational concerns could contribute to 
lower lending standards and higher credit cyclicality as emphasized by Rajan (1994). Dell’Ariccia, Igan, 
and Laeven (2012) provide empirical evidence showing that lending standards in the United States 
declined more in areas with larger credit booms and house price increases before the subprime crisis. 
Moreover, Rancière, Tornell and Westermann (2008) argue that excessive risk-taking by financial 
institutions is more likely with expectations of public bailouts. In addition, banks are likely to take more 
risks or correlated risk during the upturn of the financial cycle due to externalities from strategic 
complementarities such as cycles in collateral values (De Nicolò et al., 2012). To conclude, the presence 
of financial frictions during credit booms leads to excessive risk-taking which emphasizes the relevance 
of the banking maxim “the worst loans are made in the best of times (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016, pp. 319)”. 
Furthermore, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) examine the characteristics of credit booms followed by banking 
crises or a prolonged period of subpar growth. The authors find that credit booms that are larger in size, 
last for a longer period, and start from a higher level of credit-to-GDP ratio are more likely to end badly. 
Gorton and Ordoñez (2016) show that credit booms begin with an increase in productivity which falls 
much faster during booms followed by crisis. Moreover, several studies such as Mian and Sufi (2014) 
and Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) find that household credit (and not corporate credit) has been 
the driving factor of increased vulnerabilities to systemic banking crises. In addition, normal recessions 
and those associated with banking crises are much more severe and prolonged when preceded by a boom 
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in mortgage credit (Jordà et al., 2016). Finally, Richter et al. (2017) find that credit booms associated 
with house price booms and increasing loan-to-deposit ratios are considerably more likely to be followed 
by a systemic banking crisis.   
The main options to deal with credit booms are monetary policy, fiscal policy, and macroprudential 
instruments. Monetary policy can influence credit growth through several different channels. A 
tightening of monetary policy increases the cost of borrowing in all sectors of the economy which lowers 
the demand for credit. Moreover, a higher interest rate also influences asset prices and collateral values 
which reduces the ability to borrow (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In addition, the growth of leverage 
and bank risk-taking are reduced by higher interest rates (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). 
However, the effectiveness of monetary policy to mitigate rapid credit growth is limited by several 
factors. First, the most important limitation is the conflict of objectives between addressing credit booms 
and to maintain the inflation target. The conflict of objectives is problematic since credit booms often 
occur during tranquil macroeconomic conditions as for example in the United States before the subprime 
crisis. Second, if interest rates are raised to reduce credit growth at a time when banks, firms and 
households already have weak balance sheets, then the present debt burden would increase even further 
which may cause financial instability. Third, the “impossible trinity” implies that countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes and open capital accounts do not have independent monetary policy. A higher 
interest rate in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes can potentially lead to large capital inflows 
that increase credit growth unless the intervention is completely sterilized (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). 
Finally, a tighter monetary policy stance may increase financial risks by contributing to a substitution 
away from loans denominated in domestic currency to foreign currency loans (Rancière et al., 2008). 
The empirical evidence for that monetary policy is effective to address credit booms is in general weak. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) find that the coefficient of monetary policy tightening is unstable and rarely 
significant. This suggests that monetary policy is not effective to reduce the occurrence of credit booms 
in general or those booms that are followed by financial crises or subpar growth. However, endogeneity 
is a concern in the estimations since policymakers may tighten monetary policy to reduce the likelihood 
of credit booms which would underestimate the effectiveness of monetary policy. In addition, 
Merrouche and Nier (2010) provide comprehensive evidence that higher monetary policy rates did not 
mitigate the build-up of financial imbalances prior to the global financial crisis in the 2000s. 
Fiscal policy has both structural and cyclical elements that potentially could reduce the likelihood of 
credit booms (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016). Structural policies such as removing mortgage interest tax 
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deductibility could potentially reduce leverage in the long-run. Moreover, conducting counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy is to some extent likely to influence credit growth via its effect on economic growth. 
However, traditional fiscal policy instruments are associated with substantial time lags which are 
problematic when addressing credit booms that require a timely response. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) find 
no empirical support for that the fiscal policy stance is effective to curb credit booms. To sum up, the 
empirical evidence suggests that monetary and fiscal policies are not effective to address credit booms. 
The reason for this is likely due to the fact that these policies are relatively blunt instruments with 
potentially large negative effects on economic performance. 
Macroprudential policy instruments offer a more targeted approach to effectively address credit booms 
compared to monetary and fiscal policy. The main objective of macroprudential policies according to 
Borio (2003) is “to limit the risk of episodes of financial distress with significant losses in terms of the 
real output for the economy as a whole (Borio, 2003, p. 2)”. The purpose of microprudential instruments, 
on the contrary, is to limit financial distress at individual institutions irrespective of the effect on the 
overall economy. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) conduct an empirical exercise and find promising results 
that macroprudential policies can reduce the occurrence of credit booms in general and those followed 
by financial crises. However, one of the side effects of macroprudential policies is circumvention that 
could potentially increase systemic risk by shifting credit supply away from the banking sector to non-
bank financial institutions. Moreover, Buch and Goldberg (2017) argue that the effects of 
macroprudential policies can spill over borders via international bank lending. The authors find 
empirical evidence suggesting that the effects of prudential policies on credit growth spill over to other 
countries but that these effects on average have not been large.  
Furthermore, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) mention that their study only includes aggregate bank credit due 
to data limitations. However, the suitable choice of macroprudential policies to curb credit booms is 
most likely dependent on the type of credit.  Finally, the authors emphasize that further research is 
needed to investigate the effectiveness of macroprudential policies to deal with booms that differ in the 
type of credit.  
The main purpose of this study is to systematically investigate whether macroprudential policies are 
effective to address booms in bank and household credit. To directly examine whether macroprudential 
policies are associated with a lower likelihood of financial crises is not feasible due to the low frequency 
of crises. In addition, it is important to examine whether the macroprudential instruments are effective 
to reduce the probability of credit booms associated with systemic banking crises. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 review the empirical literature on macroprudential policies. 
Moreover, chapter 3 describes the data, the empirical approach and the method used to identify credit 
booms. Descriptive statistics for aggregate macroprudential indexes and individual instruments are 
provided in chapter 4. The main results are presented in chapter 5 and robustness tests are reported in 
chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the main findings in the paper.            
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2. Literature review 
Bianchi (2011) provide a theoretical framework showing that households fail to internalize the systemic 
feed-back effects between borrowing decisions, the real exchange rate, and financial constraints. By 
reducing the amount of debt ex-ante a downward spiral in borrowing capacity can be avoided. The 
author concludes that correcting the externality reduces the long-run probability of financial crises more 
than ten times and that there is much to gain from macroprudential regulation. 
Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven (2017a) compile a dataset on the implementation of 12 macroprudential 
policy instruments for 119 countries over the years 2000-2013. A binary variable is used to capture 
whether a macroprudential instrument is implemented in a certain year. By means of GMM regressions, 
they find that aggregate and individual indexes for macroprudential instruments are generally associated 
with a reduction in the growth rate of credit. Moreover, macroprudential instruments seem to be less 
effective in developed or open countries. In addition, the results suggest that the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies is higher during the boom phase of the credit cycle. Finally, the authors 
emphasize the importance of investigating the effectiveness of macroprudential policies to reduce the 
probability of financial crises and systemic risk (Cerutti et al., 2017a).        
Furthermore, Bruno, Shim and Shin (2017) examine the effectiveness of macroprudential policies and 
capital flow management tools in 12 Asia-Pacific countries during the period 2004-2013. Contrary to 
the study by Cerutti et al. (2017a) the authors use a quarterly dataset with macroprudential indexes 
measuring tightening and loosening actions. The results suggest that macroprudential policies are 
introduced when monetary policy is tightened and that macroprudential instruments are more effective 
when they complement monetary policy. One venue for future research suggested by the authors is to 
examine the direct and spillover effects of macroprudential policies on different types of credit. 
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) construct a database with macroprudential instruments in 57 
advanced and emerging countries between 2000 and 2013. A cumulative index with the sum of 
tightenings net of easings is employed to assess the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments. The 
study shows that macroprudential instruments have been employed more frequently in both advanced 
and developing countries after the global financial crisis. Moreover, the authors find that a tightening of 
macroprudential policies is associated with a lower growth rate in both domestic bank credit as well as 
household credit. In addition, they find that targeted policies such as loan-to-value caps seem to be more 
effective particularly in countries with bank-based financial systems.     
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Fendoğlu (2017) examine the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments for mitigating excessive 
cycles in credit for 18 major emerging market economies between 2000-2013. The dependent variable 
is the credit-to-GDP gap where the credit measure includes domestic bank credit as well as credit from 
non-bank institutions. In addition, a credit boom constructed with the method by Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2016) is also used as the dependent variable. The results suggest that borrower-targeted and domestic 
reserve requirements are effective to smooth the credit cycle. However, weak results were found for 
macroprudential policies related to financial institutions and FX-related measures. Finally, none of the 
macroprudential policy instruments in this study is significantly associated with the probability of credit 
booms.            
In addition, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) conduct an empirical exercise to examine whether 
macroprudential policies are effective to reduce the probability of credit booms. They define a credit 
boom if either of the following two conditions is fulfilled: “(1) the deviation from trend is greater than 
1.5 times its standard deviation and the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceed 10%, or 
(2) the annual growth rate of the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 20 percent (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016, pp. 
341)”. The aggregate macroprudential policy index is computed as the sum of the number of 
implemented policies similar to the approach by Cerutti et al. (2017a). Finally, the study shows that the 
aggregate macroprudential index is negatively and significantly associated with booms in domestic bank 
credit. 
This study contrasts from the paper by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) in several different ways. First of all, 
the authors only investigate if macroprudential policies are effective to deal with booms in domestic 
bank credit. However, the authors explicitly state that further analysis is needed to assess the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies to address booms in different types of credit. Consequently, 
the aim of this study is to examine if macroprudential policies can address booms in domestic bank 
credit as well as household credit. Importantly, several studies show that household credit is much more 
problematic for financial stability compared to firm credit (see discussion in chapter 5.3). In addition, 
the measure for household credit employed in this study captures total credit to households provided by 
both banks and other financial institutions.  
Furthermore, the indicator for macroprudential policies employed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) only 
measures if a policy was implemented in a certain year. The drawback of using dummy variables for 
macroprudential policies is that the indicator does not account for the intensity (tightening and 
loosening) of the policies (Galati & Moessner, 2016).  In addition, it is particularly problematic to 
 8 
 
employ binary indicators when assessing the effectiveness of individual macroprudential policies to 
address credit booms due to the low variability. However, the indicators used in this study measures the 
cumulative sum of tightenings net of easings since the year 2000. Consequently, the indicators measure 
the overall “macroprudential policy stance” and have higher variability. Moreover, the indicators in this 
paper are measured with quarterly frequency compared to yearly frequency in the study by Dell’Ariccia 
et al. (2016). Moessner and Galati (2016) emphasize the importance of using data with higher frequency 
since it makes it easier to differentiate the effect of macroprudential policies on credit booms from the 
impact of other policies. To sum up, the indicators for macroprudential policies employed in this paper 
are more precise since they measure to some extent the tightness of macroprudential policies at a 
quarterly frequency. 
Finally, the methodology to identify credit booms differs significantly between this study and the paper 
by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016). The authors use the ratio of credit divided by GDP whereas in this paper 
credit is normalized by population. Chapter 3.3 discuss why a per capita normalization is preferred to a 
normalization by GDP. In addition, this paper also includes several robustness checks such as splitting 
the data into different country samples and time periods that further strengthens the reliability of the 
results. 
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3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Data 
The dataset encompasses quarterly data for 41 advanced and developing countries during the period 
1970Q1-2014Q4. The countries included in the analysis are listed in Table A3 in the appendix. Data to 
generate the binary dependent variable (credit boom) has been collected from the BIS Total Credit 
Statistics database. Two different types of credit are used in this study: domestic bank credit and 
household credit to the non-financial private sector. The measure on credit to households include 
domestic bank credit, cross-border credit, and credit from non-bank institutions. 
Quarterly data on macroprudential policies for the period 2000Q1-2014Q4 has been collected from the 
IBRN Prudential Instruments Database (Cerutti et al., 2017b). Following the categorization of prudential 
policies in Cerutti et al. (2017a), the five macroprudential policy instruments are Loan-to-Value (LTV) 
caps, concentration limits, interbank exposure limits, reserve requirements on local or foreign currency-
denominated accounts. A discrete index (indicator variable) is employed to capture changes in the 
macroprudential policy instruments that takes value 1 for a tightening and -1 for an easing of the 
instrument. In addition, the reserve requirement instruments can take values higher or lower than 1 or -
1 which better captures the intensity of the changes in contrast to the other macroprudential policy tools 
(Cerutti et al., 2017b). 
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) argue that the ideal index would measure the intensity of 
macroprudential policies such as using the actual percentage requirement on loan-to-value caps. 
However, borrowers in different countries can face different LTV caps depending on where the property 
is located or the price of the property which makes it difficult to compare across countries. This problem 
is not isolated to LTV caps but also applies to other macroprudential instruments. Consequently, 
indicator variables measuring tightenings (+1) and easings (-1) of macroprudential instruments are 
employed in this study as well as several other studies with cross-country data. 
The main source of the Prudential Instruments Database is the Global Macroprudential Policy 
Instruments (GMPI) survey and primary information from the IMF or IBRN. This data has been 
complemented with secondary sources from IMF datasets compiled by Lim et al. (2011) and other 
databases from Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018), Kuttner and Shim (2013), and Reinhardt and 
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Sowerbutts (2015). In addition, the database has been reviewed by staff from central banks participating 
in IBRN to ensure that the dataset is accurate and complete (Cerutti et al., 2017b). 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratio Limits is the maximum amount households or firms can borrow given the 
collateral. The index for LTV caps measures changes in limits that affect real estate transactions but not 
changes in banks risk weights linked with LTV ratios. This instrument affects the demand for credit 
independently of the type of lender. Moreover, concentration limits constrain the fraction of assets held 
by a limited number of borrowers. In addition, interbank exposure limits put a ceiling on the fraction of 
liabilities held by the banking sector or individual banks (Cerutti et al. 2017a).  
The concentration and interbank exposure limits can be altered by modifying five different 
characteristics. First, the definition of large exposures “the sum of all exposure values of a bank to a 
counterparty or to a group of connected counterparties… is equal to or above 10% of the bank’s eligible 
capital base (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014)” can be changed. Second, the level of the 
limit can be modified by changing the definition of the exposures by a bank’s capital or in monetary 
terms. Third, the weight of the exposures to counterparties as well as the duration of the claims can be 
altered. Fourth, the threshold of aggregate concentration limits defined as the sum of all large exposures 
for banks can be increased or reduced. Finally, the sectors and assets covered by the policies can be 
modified by for example only include depository institutions or to also include non-bank financial 
institutions (Cerutti et al., 2017b).      
Reserve requirements (RR) are typically used to conduct monetary policy. However, Cordella et al. 
(2014) show that these instruments have also been applied as countercyclical macroprudential tools. The 
GMPI survey asks respondents whether this tool has been used as a monetary policy instrument or a 
macroprudential policy tool which makes it possible to distinguish when the tool is used as a 
macroprudential instrument. Moreover, information on reserve requirements indicates whether deposit 
accounts are denominated in domestic or foreign currency. 
Following the approach in Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and Buch and Goldberg (2017) the 
individual macroprudential policy instruments are included in three aggregate indexes. Aggregate 
macroprudential indexes are included in the empirical investigation since they measure to some extent 
the overall “macroprudential policy stance” in a country. However, it is essential to also investigate the 
effectiveness of individual instruments to deal with credit booms since aggregate indexes capture the 
change in any regulation included in the index. The index MAPP is the sum of the cumulative indexes 
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for all five macroprudential policy instruments. Moreover, since reserve requirements are almost 
exclusively used in developing countries an aggregate index MAPP_RR is constructed including both 
reserve requirements instruments. The borrower- and financial institution-targeted instruments LTV 
caps, concentration limits and interbank exposure limits are included in the aggregate index 
MAPP_B_FI. In addition, the measures for reserves requirements have been restricted to only take 
values 1 or -1 for tightenings and easings of the policies in each quarter in the aggregate indexes MAPP 
and MAPP_RR.  
Several local and global control variables commonly used in the literature are included to control for 
potential determinants of credit booms. An important global factor is the VIX index (in logs) which is a 
proxy for the leverage of global banks (Bruno et al. 2017). Moreover, local factors included are the real 
exchange rate (in logs), CPI inflation, the change in the monetary policy rate and real GDP growth. In 
addition, to control for country characteristics the level of development is proxied by GDP per capita 
and the deepness of the financial market is measured by the ratio of credit to GDP. All variable 
definitions and sources can be found in Table 1 and summary statistics are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
LTV_CAP Cumulative change (sum of easings net of tightenings) in the 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) cap.  
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
IBEX Cumulative change in the interbank exposure limit. Limits 
banks exposures to other banks. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
CONCRAT Cumulative change in concentration limits. Limits banks’ 
exposures to specific borrowers or sectors. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
RR_D Cumulative change in reserve requirements on local currency-
denominated accounts. This instrument can take values higher 
or lower than 1 or -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
RR_FX Cumulative change in reserve requirements on foreign 
currency-denominated accounts. This instrument can take 
values higher or lower than 1 or -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP Sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX. 
All individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and 
minimum changes of 1 and -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP_B_FI Sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP_RR Sum of RR_D and RR_FX. All individual instruments are 
adjusted to have maximum and minimum changes of 1 and -1 
in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
CAP_REQ Cumulative change in general capital requirements. This index 
measures regulatory changes in the Basel Accords.  
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
SSCB Cumulative change in sector-specific capital buffers.  Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
Log (VIX) The log of the VIX index. VIX Historical Price Data (CBOE) 
Real GDP growth The quarterly growth rate of real GDP. IMF IFS 
Change CB policy rate Quarterly change in the central bank policy rate.  IFS Central Bank Policy rate if available 
otherwise Discount Rate of Repurchase 
Agreement Rate. ECB deposit facility rate 
for Eurozone countries.  
Inflation The quarterly growth rate of the consumer price index. IMF IFS. 
Log (GDP per capita) 
 
Log of GDP per capita BIS, IMF IFS, and World Bank Databank 
Log (real exchange rate) Log of the real exchange rate IMF IFS. 
Bank credit (% of GDP) The ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP. Adjusted domestic bank credit to the 
private non-financial sector divided by 
GDP (BIS). Otherwise, depository 
corporations’ domestic claims on private 
sector (IMF IFS) divided by nominal GDP 
(World Bank WDI). All in LCU. 
Real bank credit growth The growth rate of real domestic bank credit to the private 
sector.  
Adjusted domestic bank credit to the 
private non-financial sector (BIS), 
otherwise depository corporations’ 
domestic claims on private sector (IMF 
IFS); divided by the GDP deflator (World 
Bank WDI). All in LCU. 
Household credit (% of 
GDP) 
The ratio of private sector household credit to GDP. The 
measure for household credit includes in addition to domestic 
bank credit also credit from non-bank institutions and cross-
border credit. 
 
Adjusted household credit to the private 
non-financial sector divided by GDP 
(BIS).  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables 
 
Notes: The Table show summary statistics for all observations between 2000Q1-2014Q4. 
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3.2. Empirical specification 
Logit regressions with credit booms as the dependent variable are estimated with White-Huber robust 
standard errors clustered by country. In addition, Logit estimations with country fixed effects and/or 
year fixed effects are also conducted to examine the robustness of the results. However, credit booms 
did not occur in some countries or years which substantially reduces the number of observations in Logit 
estimations with country or year fixed effects. Consequently, Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
estimations with country and/or year fixed effects are also conducted similarly to in the study by 
Schularick and Taylor (2012). In addition, following the empirical approach in Alter et al. (2018) Firth 
logit estimations are conducted as a robustness check. Finally, all independent variables are lagged one 
period to mitigate issues of endogeneity following the approach in the study by Cerutti et al. (2017a).  
Cumulative indexes (the sum of tightenings net of easings) are employed which gives an idea of a 
country’s “macroprudential policy stance”. The reason cumulative indexes are used instead of quarterly 
changes is that it is difficult to know when macroprudential policy instruments become binding 
constraints which depend on financial conditions (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018).  
One of the most important concerns is that macroprudential policies are implemented just before or in 
the middle of a credit boom which leads to endogeneity bias. Consequently, a positive relationship 
between credit booms and macroprudential policies should be expected. Moreover, Cerutti et al. (2017a) 
emphasize the risk that macroprudential policies are tightened exactly when the credit boom is peaking 
or when credit growth slows down after the peak. If this was the case then any negative coefficient 
between macroprudential policies and credit growth would be due to reverse causation (Cerutti et al., 
2017a). Moreover, Figures 1 and 2 show empirical evidence suggesting that many macroprudential 
policies were tightened after 2009 when credit growth was significantly lower. However, this problem 
can to some extent be mitigated by using credit booms instead of credit growth as the dependent variable. 
In short, the issue of reverse causation should be less problematic by identifying the specific time of the 
credit boom and using macroprudential policy indexes lagged one or more quarters. 
Furthermore, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) stress the fact that the macroprudential policy 
indexes are imperfect measures of the magnitude of the policy change and it is also not possible to know 
whether the policy is binding. Both these issues create attenuation bias that influences the significance 
of the coefficients. To conclude, due to both endogeneity bias and attenuation bias in the estimations a 
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negative and significant coefficient for the macroprudential policy indexes should be considered a 
conservative result and is a particularly encouraging finding.  
Most of the empirical literature assessing the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments use credit 
growth as the dependent variable. However, there are three reasons why a credit boom is the appropriate 
choice of dependent variable in this study. First, the literature shows that episodes of high or excessive 
credit growth increase the likelihood of financial crises. However, these episodes are typically not 
captured by using the yearly or quarterly growth rate of credit as the dependent variable. One important 
argument for using credit booms as the dependent variable is that macroprudential policies are likely to 
be (more) effective when credit growth is stronger. Consequently, GMM estimations are conducted to 
assess whether macroprudential policies are more effective when credit growth is higher following the 
approach in Cerutti et al. (2017a). Four different dummy variables are constructed taking value one for 
the following quarterly values: top 25% (credit growth > 3.4%), top 50% (credit growth > 1.9%), bottom 
50% (0% < credit growth < 1.9%) and bottom 25% (0% < credit growth < 1%). Table A1 in the appendix 
show preliminary results for dynamic two-step GMM estimations with the real growth rate of domestic 
bank credit as the dependent variable. All independent variables except the VIX index are treated as 
endogenous as in the study by Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018). 
The coefficient for the interaction term between the macroprudential index MAPP (including all 
macroprudential instruments) and the dummy variable for the top 25% of credit growth observations is 
found to be negative and highly significant shown in columns 1 and 5 in Table A1. Moreover, the 
interaction term with the dummy variable for the top 50% of credit growth observations is also found to 
be negative but only significant at the 10% level (column 2). However, the coefficients for interaction 
terms with the bottom 50% or 25% of credit growth observations are insignificant in all estimations 
shown in columns 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, the coefficient for interaction terms with the dummy variable 
for the top 25% of credit growth observations and sub-indexes MAPP_B_FI and MAPP_RR are also 
negative and significant shown in columns 6 and 8. In addition, Cerutti et al. (2017a) find some support 
for that macroprudential policies are more effective during the more intense phase of the financial cycle 
(top 10% of observations) and particularly so in advanced economies. In short, the preliminary findings 
that macroprudential policies are (more) effective when credit growth is stronger confirm the relevance 
of using credit booms as the dependent variable.  
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Second, if countries implement macroprudential policies when the credit cycle is peaking (or when 
credit growth is slowing down after a crisis), then any negative relationship found between 
macroprudential policy and credit growth is a consequence of reverse causality (Cerutti et al., 2017a). 
However, by identifying the specific time for credit booms and using one or several lags for the 
macroprudential policy index the problem of reverse causality can be significantly reduced.  
Finally, a binary dependent variable that captures episodes with particularly high credit growth makes 
it possible to investigate specifically those booms that precede systemic banking crises (bad booms). 
This differentiation is important since it has been found by Richter, Schularick and Wachtel (2017) as 
well as Gorton and Ordoñez (2016) that bad booms are fundamentally different from credit booms that 
are not associated with systemic banking crises (good booms). 
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3.3. Identification of credit booms 
The dependent variable (credit boom) is a dummy variable identified using the method by Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008). The variable takes value one when a boom occurs which is when credit grows faster 
than during a typical cyclical expansion otherwise zero (Calderón & Kubota, 2012). Moreover, credit 
booms are estimated for a country only if 10 years of credit data without gaps are available.  
Let fit be the deviation from the long-run trend in (the log of) real credit per capita in country (i) in year 
(t) and let 𝜎(fit) be the country-specific standard deviation of this cyclical component. A credit boom is 
identified when fit ≥ 𝜑𝜎(fit) for one or several quarters, where 𝜑 is the threshold factor (multiple of the 
standard deviation). Credit booms are identified with thresholds 1.5, 1.75 and 2 standard deviations 
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 which is standard for quarterly 
data (Calderón & Kubota, 2012).  
Caballero (2016) emphasize that a per capita normalization is preferred to a normalization by GDP. If 
credit is normalized by GDP, then it is not possible to allow for different trends in credit and GDP. This 
is problematic since Drehmann et al. (2012) find that the financial cycle has a much lower frequency 
compared to the traditional business cycle. In addition, if both credit and GDP are falling simultaneously 
but GDP is decreasing faster than credit, then the credit to GDP ratio could incorrectly signal a credit 
boom.           
It is essential to investigate whether the method by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) identifies credit booms 
that are supported by the data. Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates the average behavior of the real 
growth rate of domestic bank credit ten years before and after a boom episode for the period 2000Q1-
2014Q4. The illustration shows that the real growth rate of credit increases continuously up to the 
beginning of the credit boom (vertical line) and then drops to a growth rate of around zero. To conclude, 
the descriptive evidence suggests that the method by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) is suitable to identify 
credit boom episodes.   
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4. Descriptive statistics 
The development of aggregate macroprudential indexes (averages) and the frequency of credit booms 
during the period 2000Q1-2014Q4 is illustrated in Figure 1. Tightenings and easings of macroprudential 
policies are recorded starting from 2000Q1. Consequently, the macroprudential indexes (cumulative 
sum of tightenings net of easings) are expected to be close to zero at the beginning of the period which 
is consistent with Figures 1 and 2. The aggregate index MAPP that includes all five macroprudential 
instruments (i.e. LTV caps, concentration limits, interbank exposure limits and reserves requirements 
on accounts denominated in local or foreign currency) show a clear upward trend during the period. 
Figure 1 shows that the index MAPP starts to increase more rapidly around 2007 which coincide with 
an increasing frequency of credit booms. The rise in MAPP at the beginning of the global financial crisis 
is almost completely determined by an increase in the aggregate index for reserve requirements 
(MAPP_RR).  
Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the rise in MAPP is mainly caused by tightenings of reserve requirements 
on deposits denominated in local currency. The aggregate index with borrower- and financial 
institutions-targeted instruments (MAPP_B_FI) display a more stable upward trend until 2009. From 
around 2010 there is a considerably larger rise in the index MAPP driven by an increase in both indexes 
MAPP_RR and MAPP_B_FI. However, the frequency of the number of credit booms is much lower 
from 2010 which suggest that many macroprudential policies were tightened during a period when credit 
growth was relatively low. 
Table 3 shows that the aggregate index for borrower- and financial institution-targeted policies 
(MAPP_B_FI) is correlated with the index for reserve requirement policies (MAPP_RR). Moreover, 
MAPP_RR is positively correlated with the central bank policy rate. However, the index MAPP_B_FI 
is negatively correlated with the policy rate and this is probably because policy rates have been kept low 
in advanced countries while macroprudential policies have been tightened. 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the five individual macroprudential policy instruments between 
2000Q1 and 2014Q4. First, the borrower-targeted instrument Loan-to-Value caps show a relatively 
stable upward trend until the end of 2009. However, starting in 2009 until 2014 the average cumulative 
index for LTV caps triples from around 0.5 to 1.5. Conversely, both financial institution-targeted 
instruments (i.e. concentration limits and interbank exposure limits) display a smoother upward trend 
for the entire period. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate macroprudential indexes (averages) and credit booms 2000Q1-2014Q4
 
Table 3. Correlation between MAPP and other policies 
Notes: The Table shows the correlation between aggregate macroprudential indexes and other policies in 41 
countries between 2000Q1-2014Q4. The aggregate indexes are MAPP_B_FI (including LTV_CAP, IBEX, and 
CONCRAT) and MAPP_RR (including RR_D and RR_FX). The other policies are the Central Bank policy rate 
(CB policy rate), capital requirements (CAP_REQ) and sector-specific capital buffers (SSCB). *signifies that the 
correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
Furthermore, the index for reserve requirements related to foreign currency shows a relatively flat trend 
fluctuating around zero until 2010. Starting in 2010 the index shows a steady upward trend until 2014. 
Finally, the index for reserve requirements on accounts denominated in local currency is negative for 
almost the entire period which implies that easings were more common than tightenings. However, the 
frequency (or size) of the tightenings of the index was more pronounced during the periods 2006-2008 
and 2010-2011.      
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Table 4 show pairwise correlations between individual macroprudential policy instruments. Loan-to-
Value caps (LTV_CAP) is positively correlated with all other individual policies. However, interbank 
exposure limits (IBEX) and concentration limits (CONCRAT) are weakly negatively correlated. In 
addition, the reserve requirement policies (RR_D and RR_FX) are positively correlated.   
Table 4. Correlation between individual macroprudential policies 
 
Notes: The table shows the correlation between the cumulative indexes for five macroprudential policy instruments 
in 41 countries between 2000Q1-2014Q4. The policies are Loan-to-Value Caps (LTV_CAP), interbank exposure 
limits (IBEX), concentration limits (CONCRAT), reserve requirements on accounts denominated in local currency 
(RR_D) and foreign currency (RR_FX). * signifies that the correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
 
Figure 2. Macroprudential policy instruments (averages) 2000Q1-2014Q4
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Macroprudential policies and bank credit booms 
Results for estimations with bank credit booms and the aggregate index MAPP including all five 
macroprudential policies are shown in Table 5. The MAPP index has a negative coefficient that is 
significant at least at the 5% level for all Logit estimations displayed in columns 1-4. Moreover, the 
coefficient for MAPP is also negative and significant in the LPM estimations with country fixed effects 
(columns 5 and 7). However, the MAPP index is not significant in the LPM estimation with only year 
fixed effects (column 6).  Finally, the MAPP index is also negative and significant in the Firth logit 
estimation shown in column 8.  
The aggregate index MAPP_B_FI including LTV caps, concentration limits and interbank exposure 
limits has a negative and significant coefficient in all Logit, LPM, and Firth logit estimations (columns 
1-4) shown in Table 6. Moreover, the index MAPP_RR including reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in foreign or domestic currency is negative and significant at the 1% or 10% level for the 
Logit and LPM estimations (columns 5-7). However, index MAPP_RR is not significant in the Firth 
logit estimation (column 8). The results for the macroprudential sub-indexes suggests that both 
borrower- and financial institution-targeted instruments (MAPP_B_FI), as well as reserve requirement 
policies (MAPP_RR), are effective to deal with credit booms. 
The number of bank credit boom observations is 61 in all estimations for the aggregate indexes. 
However, the number of countries is 41 without country fixed effects but only 24 with fixed effects. The 
reason for the difference in the number of countries is that almost half of the countries either did not 
experience a credit boom or lack data for at least one control variable during the credit boom episode. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for the MAPP index typically remains negative and significant for lags up 
to 6 quarters which provide additional support for the robustness of the results. Consequently, the 
aforementioned issue of reverse causality that negative coefficients are due to a tightening of the 
macroprudential policy instruments at the peak or after the peak of the credit boom is not likely to be 
the case.  
The coefficient for the VIX index is found to be positive and highly significant in all estimations. This 
is the opposite results to the findings by Bruno et al. (2017) and Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) 
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who find a negative coefficient when using credit growth as the dependent variable. However, the 
dependent variable in this study is credit booms (not credit growth) which are often succeeded by 
financial crises. During the 2000s many of the financial crises in advanced countries began almost at the 
same time as the crisis in the United States which implies that a positive coefficient for the VIX index 
lagged one quarter is not surprising. In addition, it is only the first lag of the VIX index that is positive 
and significant while lags 2-5 are negative but not significant. Moreover, the coefficient for the real 
exchange rate is positive and significant only in the estimations with country fixed effects. Finally, the 
level of bank credit to GDP is also positive and significant with country fixed effects. 
Results for borrower- and financial institution-targeted instruments are shown in Table 7. The 
coefficients for Loan-to-Value caps (LTV_CAP) and interbank exposure limits (IBEX) are negative but 
not significant in any of the Logit, LPM or Firth logit estimations (columns 1-6). The coefficients for 
concentration limits (CONCRAT) are negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level in the LPM and 
Firth logit estimations (columns 8 and 9). 
Furthermore, results for reserve requirement policies are shown in Table 8. Reserve requirements on 
local currency denominated accounts (RR_D) are found to be negative and significant at the 1% level 
both for Logit and LPM estimations with country fixed effects. However, the coefficient is not 
significant for Logit estimation without country fixed effects and the Firth logit estimation. Moreover, 
the coefficient for reserve requirements on foreign currency accounts (RR_FX) is negative in all 
estimations but only significant in the Logit estimation with country fixed effects. 
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Table 5. Aggregate macroprudential index (MAPP) 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms and the 
threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, 
IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered 
by country are reported for Logit and LPM estimations without country fixed effects. All independent variables 
are lagged one quarter. 
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Table 6. Aggregate macroprudential sub-indexes (MAPP_B_FI & MAPP_RR)  
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms and the 
threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The indexes MAPP_B_FI includes borrower- and financial institutions-
targeted macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT) and the index MAPP_RR includes 
reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). The time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country are reported for Logit and LPM estimations without country fixed effects. All independent 
variables are lagged one quarter. 
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Table 7. Borrower- and financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. Loan-to-Value Caps (LTV_CAP) is a borrower-targeted instrument while 
interbank exposure limits (IBEX) and concentration limits (CONCRAT) are financial institution-targeted policies 
according to the categorization of macroprudential policies by Cerutti et al. (2017a). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter is used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The time period is 2000Q1-
2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit estimations without country fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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Table 8. Reserve requirement policies 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. The macroprudential instruments are reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in domestic currency (RR_D) and foreign currency (RR_FX). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is 
used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit estimations without country fixed effects. All 
independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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5.2. Credit booms and banking crises 
Credit booms have so far been treated as identical and no difference has been made between booms that 
are benign compared to those followed by systemic banking crises. However, if the purpose of 
macroprudential policies is to mitigate financial instability, then it is essential to examine whether these 
policies can be effective to deal with credit booms followed by systemic banking crises. 
Data on systemic banking crises have been collected from Laeven and Valencia (2013). The authors 
define a banking crisis as an event that meets two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress 
in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank 
liquidations). (2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in 
the banking system (Laeven and Valencia, 2013)”.   
A credit boom is defined as “bad” if a systemic banking crisis occurs during the credit boom or within 
three years after the end of the boom similar to the approach by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) and Richter 
et al. (2017). If a credit boom episode coincides with a banking crisis but begins after the first year of 
the crisis then these observations are excluded from the estimations. All credit booms that are not “bad” 
according to this criterion are defined as “good”. The total number of observations for good booms is 
188 while the number of bad booms is 80 for the period 1970Q1-2014Q4. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the behavior of the average ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP ten years 
before and after the first quarter of a credit boom episode. Good credit booms are on average 
characterized by a continuous increase in the ratio of bank credit to GDP up to the first quarter that is 
above the threshold of 1.75 s.d. illustrated by the vertical line in Figure 3. After the first quarter of the 
good boom (66 episodes) the ratio of credit to GDP stagnate for five years and then continues to climb. 
Figure 4 shows that the ratio of bank credit to GDP ten years before a bad credit boom (24 episodes) 
start at a higher level on average compared to good booms. Moreover, the increase in the level of bank 
credit (as percent of GDP) is slightly higher on average for bad booms compared to good booms during 
the decade before the credit boom. When the bad boom has started the level of bank credit to GDP falls 
back to the level ten years before the credit boom. Importantly, the trend of the average ratio of bank 
credit to GDP during the decade before both good and bad booms is very similar while the trend diverges 
completely after the credit boom.  
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The behavior of the average real GDP growth five years before and after good and bad credit booms is 
illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. The real growth rate of GDP fluctuates between 4-5 percent during the 
five years prior to the first quarter of both good and bad credit boom episodes. Just before the credit 
boom episode begins the growth rate drops for both types of booms. However, the fall in the real growth 
rate of GDP is much larger for bad booms compared to good booms. Consequently, it is important to 
examine whether macroprudential policies can be effective to reduce the likelihood of those credit 
booms that cause substantial economic costs.    
Table 9 shows results for Logit, LPM, and Firth logit estimations with good booms and bad booms 
separately. The coefficient for the aggregate macroprudential policy instrument MAPP is negative and 
significant in all estimations with bad credit booms (columns 5, 6 and 8) except LPM estimation with 
both country and year fixed effects (column 7). Moreover, the aggregate index MAPP is negative and 
significant in all estimations with good credit booms (columns 1-3) except for Firth logit (column 4). 
To conclude, the results suggest that macroprudential policies are not only effective to deal with credit 
booms but also specifically those booms that are followed by systemic banking crises. 
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Figure 3. Average ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP around good boom episodes
 
Figure 4. Average ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP around bad boom episodes
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Figure 5. Average real growth rate of GDP around good boom episodes
 
Figure 6. Average real growth rate of GDP around bad boom episodes
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Table 9. Good and bad credit booms 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms and the 
threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, 
IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. A credit boom is defined as “bad” 
if a systemic banking crisis occurs during the credit boom or within three years after the end of the boom similar 
to the approach by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016). If a credit boom episode coincides with a banking crisis but begins 
after the first year of the crisis then these observations are excluded from the estimations. All credit booms that 
are not “bad” according to this criterion are defined as “good”. Robust standard errors clustered by country are 
reported for Logit and LPM estimations without country fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged one 
quarter. 
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5.3. Macroprudential policies and household credit booms 
Mian and Sufi (2010) show using microeconomic data that changes in household leverage were a 
powerful predictor of the onset and severity of the Great Recession in the United States. Furthermore, 
Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) investigate the role of household and corporate credit expansions in 
banking crises for 37 developing and advanced countries. Rapidly increasing credit to the entire private 
sector is associated with banking crises. However, decomposing the aggregate credit measure shows 
that household credit has been the driving factor of increased vulnerabilities to systemic banking crises. 
Corporate credit has a statistically significant effect on the probability of a subsequent banking crisis 
although it is weaker and less robust (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010).  
Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016) provide a new disaggregated dataset including both mortgage and 
non-mortgage credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The authors show that mortgage lending 
on banks’ balance sheets has doubled during the 20th century driven by lending to households. 
Moreover, both normal recessions and those associated with financial crises since World War II tend to 
be considerably more severe and have a slower recovery when preceded by a large expansion in 
mortgage credit. Conversely, non-mortgage credit booms have basically no effect on the likelihood of 
recessions today (Jordà et al., 2016). 
Figure 7 illustrates that the average ratio of household credit to GDP does not increase during the ten 
years preceding a boom in domestic bank credit (32 episodes) that is not followed by a systemic banking 
crisis (good boom). However, Figure 8 shows that household credit as percent of GDP increase 
considerably before a bank credit boom (20 episodes) associated with a banking crisis (bad boom). The 
different pattern of the ratio of household credit to GDP before good booms and bad booms confirm the 
relevance of household credit for explaining the occurrence of financial crises. 
Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix show the behavior of both household credit and firm credit (% of 
GDP) around good and bad credit booms. The median ratio of firm credit to GDP increases both before 
good and bad credit booms. However, while the median ratio of household credit to GDP show a clear 
upward trend before bad credit booms this is not the case before good credit booms. Household credit 
(% of GDP) does not seem to increase before good credit booms in contrast to for firm credit. In short, 
the behavior of household credit contains information that is useful to identify those credit booms that 
are followed by financial crises. 
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Knyazeva et al. (2009) argue that external financing is essential for private investment and economic 
growth. However, this refers almost exclusively to corporate credit and not household credit. Jappelli 
and Pagano (1994) provide a theoretical framework showing that an increase in household credit 
decreases savings and consequently private investment which reduces economic growth. The authors 
also provide empirical evidence for that a liquidity constraint on households enhances economic growth.  
Furthermore, Beck et al. (2012) show that corporate credit is positively correlated with growth while the 
relationship between household credit and growth is insignificant. In addition, Bezemer et al. (2015) 
find that credit to non-financial firms raises economic growth. However, financial development was 
mostly credit to real estate and other assets since 1990 which does not contribute to growth. In short, 
new bank lending is not primarily credit to firms which implies that financial development may no 
longer be good for growth. 
Finally, Mian and Sufi conclude from the international and U.S. evidence that “Economic disasters are 
almost always preceded by a large increase in household debt. In fact, the correlation is so robust that 
it is as close it gets to an empirical law in macroeconomics (Mian & Sufi, 2014, p. 9)”. To sum up, it is 
essential to examine whether macroprudential policies can be effective to deal with booms in household 
credit. 
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Figure 7. Average household credit (% of GDP) around good credit booms
 
Figure 8. Average household credit (% of GDP) around bad credit booms 
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Table 10 shows the results for the MAPP index and household credit booms with threshold 1.75 standard 
deviations. The measure of household credit includes not only domestic bank credit but also credit from 
non-bank financial institutions and cross-border credit. Consequently, this credit measure is suitable to 
assess the effectiveness of macroprudential policies since it addresses the issue of circumvention 
discussed in the introductory chapter. The macroprudential index MAPP has a negative coefficient and 
is statistically significant in all estimations except for LPM with only year fixed effects.  
The results for the macroprudential sub-indexes MAPP_B_FI and MAPP_RR are shown in Table 11. 
The MAPP_B_FI index is negatively and strongly associated with the occurrence of household credit 
booms in all estimations. However, the coefficient for the MAPP_RR index is negative but only 
significant at the 10% level in two of the estimations. In addition, the MAPP_B_FI index has a higher 
statistical significance in estimations with household credit booms compared to the results for bank 
credit booms (Table 6) while the opposite is true for the MAPP_RR index. Finally, it should be 
emphasized that only 10 developing countries are included in the estimations with household credit 
booms compared to 14 countries for bank credit booms. 
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Table 10. Aggregate macroprudential index (MAPP) and household credit booms 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary 
dependent variable for household credit booms. The measure for household credit includes in addition to 
domestic bank credit also credit from non-bank institutions and cross-border credit. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter is used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The MAPP index includes all 
five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 
2000Q1-2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit and LPM estimations 
without country fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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Table 11. Aggregate macroprudential sub-indexes (MAPP_B_FI & MAPP_RR) 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for household credit booms. The measure for household credit includes in addition to domestic bank 
credit also credit from non-bank institutions and cross-border credit. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to 
identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.75 standard deviations. The indexes MAPP_B_FI includes borrower- 
and financial institutions-targeted macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT) and the index 
MAPP_RR includes reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). The time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit and LPM estimations without country fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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5.4. Economic interpretation 
The results above show that aggregate macroprudential indexes are negatively associated with the 
probability of booms in both bank and household credit. However, it is important to assess how large 
the effect is in economic terms of an increase in the macroprudential indexes on the likelihood of credit 
booms. Consequently, average marginal effects for the macroprudential policy indexes are estimated 
following the approach by Kirschenmann et al. (2016). 
Table 12 shows the average marginal effects for the macroprudential index MAPP (column 1 in Table 
5, and columns 1 and 5 in Table 13) from estimations with bank credit booms. The average standard 
deviation for the MAPP index is approximately 1.261 for bank credit booms. An increase in the MAPP 
index by one standard deviation reduces the likelihood of bank credit booms with threshold 1.75 
standard deviations by approximately 0.77 percentage points. This effect is relatively large in economic 
terms since the sample frequency of credit booms with this threshold is only 2.81 percent. Moreover, 
the results in Table 12 also show that sub-index MAPP_B_FI reduce the probability of bank credit 
booms (threshold 1.75 s.d.) by about 0.66 percentage points compared to 0.37 percentage points for sub-
index MAPP_RR. This finding is not entirely surprising since reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in local or foreign currency are mainly used in developing countries. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of macroprudential policies could be different between credit booms of 
different size. Accordingly, average marginal effects for bank credit booms with thresholds 1 and 2 
standard deviations are shown in columns 1 and 3 in Table 12. An increase in the MAPP index by one 
standard deviation reduces the likelihood of smaller credit booms (threshold 1 s.d.) by about 1.35 
percentage points compared to 0.46 percentage points for larger credit booms (threshold 2 s.d.). 
However, the sample frequency of smaller credit booms (5.48 percent) is significantly higher compared 
to larger credit booms (1.47 percent). Consequently, the effect of an increase in the MAPP index on the 
occurrence of credit booms relative to the sample frequency is higher for larger credit booms compared 
to smaller booms. In addition, similar results are also found for the aggregate index MAPP and 
household credit booms with threshold 1 and 1.75 standard deviations. 
It could be of interest to examine whether the effectiveness of macroprudential policies differs between 
booms in bank and household credit. Since MAPP_RR is only significant for smaller household credit 
booms it is suitable to compare the results for the sub-index MAPP_B_FI. An increase in the 
MAPP_B_FI index by one standard deviation reduces the occurrence of smaller household credit booms 
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(threshold 1 s.d.) by 1.09 percentage points compared to 1.06 percentage points for bank credit booms 
of the same size. However, the sample frequency for household credit booms is only 3.92 percent 
compared to 5.48 percent for booms in bank credit. This implies that the effect of an increase in 
MAPP_B_FI on the probability of household credit booms is higher compared to booms in bank credit 
even though the sample frequency is significantly lower. Moreover, similar results for the MAPP_B_FI 
index are also found when comparing bank and household credit booms with threshold 1.75 standard 
deviations. In addition, these findings are robust to only including advanced countries in the estimations 
which implies that the country sample is the same for household and bank credit booms. 
To sum up, the results suggest that the effect of an increase in the MAPP index on the probability of 
credit booms is relatively large in economic terms, and moreover this effect seems to be greater for 
larger credit booms. In addition, borrower- and financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies 
(MAPP_B_FI) seem to be more effective to deal with booms in household credit compared to bank 
credit booms.   
Table 12. Average marginal effects for macroprudential indexes 
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6. Robustness tests 
To examine the robustness of the results it is essential to identify credit booms with different thresholds. 
Figure 9 illustrates the frequency of credit booms for thresholds with 1.5, 1.75 and 2 standard deviations. 
The general pattern suggests that credit booms with a lower threshold are significantly more frequent 
and occur for a longer time than booms with a higher threshold. Table 11 show that the number of credit 
boom episodes double from 61 to 119 when the boom threshold is 1.5 instead of 1.75 standard 
deviations. Similarly, the number of credit booms is 32 with a threshold of 2 standard deviations which 
is only half of the number of episodes compared to for a boom threshold of 1.75 standard deviations. In 
short, the number of credit booms and the magnitude of these booms differs considerably depending on 
whether the boom threshold is 1.5, 1.75 or 2 standard deviations. 
Table 13 show that the coefficient for the macroprudential policy index (MAPP) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all estimations with small credit booms (1.5 s.d.). For larger credit booms 
(2 s.d.) the MAPP index is negative and significant in all estimations except for LPM with both country 
and year fixed effects. To conclude, the findings suggest that macroprudential policies are effective to 
deal with both smaller and larger credit booms. 
Figure 9. Distribution of credit booms with different thresholds between 2000Q1-2014Q4 
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Table 13. MAPP index and credit booms with different thresholds  
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for bank credit booms. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms with thresholds 
1.5 or 2 standard deviations. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, 
CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country for Logit estimations. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
Table 14 shows results for borrower- and financial institution-targeted policies with boom threshold 1.5 
standard deviations. The coefficient for concentration limits is negative and significant at the 1% level 
for LPM with country fixed effects and at the 5% level for Firth logit. Moreover, interbank exposure 
limits are negative and significant at the 10% level for logit and 5% level for Firth logit. However, the 
coefficient for Loan-to-Value caps remains insignificant. The number of credit booms is about twice as 
many compared to for boom threshold 1.75 standard deviations shown in Table 7. In addition, results 
for credit booms with threshold 1.25 standard deviations are shown in Table A2 in the appendix. The 
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results show that the coefficient for Loan-to-Value caps is negative and significant at the 5% level for 
LPM with country fixed effects. 
Table 14. Borrower- and financial institution-targeted policies (boom threshold 1.5 s.d.) 
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. Loan-to-Value Caps (LTV_CAP) is a borrower-targeted instrument while 
interbank exposure limits (IBEX) and concentration limits (CONCRAT) are financial institution-targeted policies 
according to the categorization of macroprudential policies by Cerutti et al. (2017a). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter is used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.5 standard deviations. The time period is 2000Q1-
2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit estimations without country fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
The results for individual reserve requirement policies and credit booms with threshold 1.5 standard 
deviations are shown in Table 15. The coefficient for reserve requirements on accounts denominated in 
domestic currency (RR_D) is negative and significant at least at the 5% level in all estimations. 
However, reserve requirements on foreign currency accounts (RR_FX) are only negative and significant 
in the LPM estimation with country fixed effects. 
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Table 15. Reserve requirement policies (boom threshold 1.5 s.d.) 
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. The macroprudential instruments are reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in domestic currency (RR_D) and foreign currency (RR_FX). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is 
used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.5 standard deviations. The time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit estimations without country fixed effects. All 
independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
The global financial crisis originated in the United States in 2007 and later spread to the rest of the world 
with large consequences for economic growth and capital flows. A majority of the tightenings of 
macroprudential policies were after the beginning of the crisis according to Akinci and Olmstead-
Rumsey (2018). Consequently, it is essential to examine whether macroprudential policies were 
effective to reduce the likelihood of credit booms both before and after the start of the crisis. 
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Similar to the approach by Bruno et al. (2017) separate estimations are conducted for the period 2000Q1-
2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2014Q4 shown in Table 16. The coefficient for the macroprudential index MAPP 
is negative and typically significant for both the period before the crisis (2000Q1-2006Q4) and after 
(2007Q1-2014Q4). However, the coefficient for the MAPP index is not significant for LPM estimations 
with both country and year fixed effects. It should be emphasized that more than two-thirds of the booms 
occurred during the period 2007Q1-2014Q4. 
Table 16. Separate estimations for time periods 2000Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2014Q4 
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for bank credit booms. Separate estimations for time periods 2000Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2014Q4. The 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms with threshold 1.5 standard deviations. The MAPP 
index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). Robust 
standard errors clustered by country for Logit estimations. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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Furthermore, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) report that a majority of the tightenings of 
macroprudential policies during the period 2000-2013 were in emerging economies. Figures 10 and 11 
illustrate the development of individual macroprudential policies for advanced and developing countries 
separately. The index for Loan-to-Value caps displays a similar pattern for both advanced and 
developing countries although the index is generally at a higher average level in developing countries. 
Moreover, the index for concentration limits increases gradually over the entire period in advanced 
countries while in developing countries the index rises until around 2007 and then remain stable until 
2014. In addition, interbank exposure limits show a similar pattern to concentration limits for the two 
country groups. However, the index for interbank exposure limits was in 2014 twice as high on average 
in advanced countries compared to developing countries, while the index for concentration limits was 
at a similar level for both country groups in this year.  
The use of reserve requirements is completely different in advanced economies compared to for 
developing countries as shown in Figures 10 and 11. In advanced countries, reserve requirements related 
to foreign currency deposits were almost never used during the entire period. Reserve requirements 
related to local currency, on the other hand, show a large drop in the index in 2000 followed by an almost 
constant trend until 2011 when the index falls to an even lower level. However, in developing countries 
both types of reserve requirements are being used frequently and show a similar pattern, albeit with 
higher fluctuations for reserve requirements on deposits denominated in local currency.  
Following the approach by Cerutti et al. (2017a) separate estimations are conducted for advanced and 
developing countries shown in Table 17. Table A3 in the appendix shows that one-third of the 41 
countries are classified as developing countries and two thirds as advanced economies. The MAPP index 
is negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level in all estimations for developing countries shown in 
Table 17. In addition, the coefficient for the MAPP index is also negative and significant for advanced 
economies except for LPM estimation with both country and year fixed effects.  
Furthermore, re-estimating the specifications in Table 17 for the macroprudential sub-indexes show that 
index MAPP_B_FI is negative and typically significant for both advanced and developing countries. In 
addition, the sub-index MAPP_RR is found to be negative and significant in all estimations for 
developing countries. However, index MAPP_RR is not significant in Logit and LPM estimations for 
advanced economies, which is consistent with the pattern for individual reserve requirement policies 
illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. 
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Figure 10. Macroprudential policy indexes (averages) in advanced countries
 
Figure 11. Macroprudential policy indexes (averages) in developing countries
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Table 17. Separate estimations for advanced and developing countries 
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for bank credit booms. Separate estimations for advanced and developing countries. The Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter is used to identify credit booms with threshold 1.5 standard deviations. The MAPP index 
includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). Robust 
standard errors clustered by country for Logit estimations. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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6.1. Alternative definition of credit booms 
Hamilton (2017) argues that detrending the data with a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter can lead to spurious 
dynamic relations in the data that have no basis in the underlying data generating process. Consequently, 
an alternative method to identify credit booms from Richter, Schularick, and Wachtel (2017) is 
employed to test the robustness of the results.  
The detrending method suggested by Hamilton (2017) assumes that the trend component (t) is the value 
that could have been predicted with historical data. First, denote (h) the horizon used to build the 
prediction. The cyclical component is the difference between the realized value (yt) and the expectation 
of the value at (t) formed at time (t-h) based on data available at that time (Richter et al., 2017). Hamilton 
(2017) suggest that the residual can be obtained by conducting an OLS regression of the following form: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−ℎ + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−ℎ−1 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑡−ℎ−2 + 𝛽4𝑦𝑡−ℎ−3 + 𝑣𝑡 
The value for horizon (h) is based on the assumption about the cyclical component. Hamilton (2017) 
suggest a horizon of 2 years for business cycles and 5 years for debt cycles. Since the objective is to 
identify credit booms the choice of horizon in this study is 20 quarters which correspond to the 5 years 
for debt cycles. Furthermore, Hamilton (2017) argues that using more than 4 lags, including more 
variables or a non-linear specification are unnecessary to extract the stationary component. In addition, 
including more parameters to estimate the regression has a considerable drawback. The more parameters 
included the more the small-sample estimates are expected to differ from the asymptotic predictions.    
Once the country-specific residuals have been estimated with the Hamilton filter the method by 
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) is used to identify credit booms. Consequently, a credit boom is identified 
if the detrended credit measure is above a threshold which is a multiple of the country-specific standard 
deviation (Richter et al., 2017). 
Table 18 shows the results for the MAPP index and credit booms identified with the Hamilton filter. 
The coefficient for the aggregate index MAPP is typically negative and significant at the 10% level for 
bank credit booms with thresholds 1.75 and 2 standard deviations (columns 5-9). In addition, the MAPP 
index is negative and significant at the 5% level for the Firth logit estimation with boom threshold 1.5 
standard deviations (column 3).  
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Table 18. Credit booms identified with Hamilton filter 
 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for bank credit booms. The Hamilton filter is used to identify credit booms with thresholds 1.5, 1.75 or 2 
standard deviations. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, 
CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country for Logit and LPM estimations. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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6.2. Additional control variables in the analysis  
It is important to verify whether the results hold when controlling for other prudential policies. Table 19 
report results for estimations including general capital requirements (CAP_REQ) and an aggregate index 
for sector-specific capital buffers (SSCB) as additional control variables. Data on capital requirements 
and capital buffers has been collected from Cerutti et al. (2017b). The general capital requirements index 
is constructed from the changes in the regulatory framework in the Basel Accords and revisions I, II, 
II.5 and III. Moreover, it is assumed that the implementation of the Basel Accords never loosens the 
existing regulation which implies that the index for capital requirements never take value -1.  The sector-
specific capital buffer index measures regulatory changes that aim to reduce the growth in bank claims 
to specific sectors of the economy.  
Table 19 show that the coefficient for the MAPP index is negative and significant at the 5% or 10% 
level for credit booms identified with the Hamilton filter and boom threshold 1.75 (except for LPM with 
country fixed effects). In addition, the coefficient for MAPP is negative and highly significant both with 
and without country fixed effects for booms generated with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. However, 
the coefficient for the MAPP index is not significant for the LPM estimation with only year fixed effects 
for credit booms identified with the HP filter. 
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Table 19. Estimations including bank-capital-based prudential policies 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for bank credit booms. The boom threshold is 1.75 standard deviations in all estimations. The Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter or the Hamilton filter is used to identify credit booms. The MAPP index includes all five 
macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX) and the time period is 2000Q1-
2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by country for Logit and LPM estimations without country fixed effects. 
All independent variables are lagged one quarter. The bank-capital-based prudential policies are capital 
requirements (CAP_REQ) and sector-specific capital buffers (SSCB).    
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7. Conclusion 
Credit booms are one of the most important determinants of financial crises in advanced and developing 
countries. The objective of macroprudential policy is to avoid macroeconomic costs related to financial 
instability. Consequently, the main contribution of this study is to investigate whether macroprudential 
policies have been effective to deal with booms in bank and household credit. 
The results strongly suggest that aggregate indexes with macroprudential policies are negatively and 
significantly associated with booms in domestic bank credit. Moreover, individual macroprudential 
policy instruments are also found to reduce the occurrence of bank credit booms. In addition, the results 
also show that aggregate indexes with macroprudential policies are suitable to address specifically those 
credit booms that are followed by systemic banking crises. This finding suggests that macroprudential 
policies are not only effective to reduce credit growth but may also be useful to curb credit booms that 
lead to a financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the empirical literature clearly shows that household credit is more important for the 
occurrence and severity of financial crises compared to corporate credit. This implies that it is essential 
to examine the effectiveness of macroprudential policies on household credit and not only on the 
aggregate measure with domestic bank credit. The results show that macroprudential policies are 
negatively linked to the likelihood of household credit booms. 
The findings also suggest that the effect of an increase in the aggregate macroprudential index (including 
all instruments) on the likelihood of bank credit booms is relatively large in economic terms. Moreover, 
this effect seems to be greater for larger booms in bank credit. In addition, the results show that 
borrower- and financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies are more effective to address 
household credit booms compared to booms in bank credit. 
Finally, several robustness tests are conducted to check if the results are reliable for example using 
different boom thresholds, time periods and country groups. In addition, estimations with an alternative 
method to identify credit booms and including additional control variables provide further support for 
that macroprudential policies are effective to address credit booms.       
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Appendix 
Table A1. GMM estimations with aggregate macroprudential indexes 
Notes: Table showing dynamic two-step GMM estimations with the real growth rate of domestic bank credit as 
the dependent variable. All regressors are treated as endogenous (including the interaction term) except the VIX 
index which is treated as exogenous similar to in the paper by Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018). The time 
period is 2000Q1-2014Q4. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, 
CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). The indexes MAPP_B_FI includes borrower- and financial institutions-targeted 
macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT) and the index MAPP_RR includes reserve 
requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). The focus of this study is to assess the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies during the boom phase of the financial cycle. Consequently,  the dummy variables top 
25%, top 50%, bottom 50% and bottom 25% only take value one for observations with positive credit growth. The 
four different dummy variables takes value one for the following quarterly values: top 25% (credit growth > 3.4%), 
top 50% (credit growth > 1.9%), bottom 50% (0% < credit growth < 1.9%) and bottom 25% (0% < credit growth 
< 1%). All independent variables except the VIX index are lagged one quarter. 
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Table A2. Borrower- and financial institution-targeted policies (boom threshold 1.25 s.d.) 
Notes: Table showing Logit, Linear Probability Model (LPM) and Firth logit estimations with a binary dependent 
variable for domestic bank credit booms. Loan-to-Value Caps (LTV_CAP) is a borrower-targeted instrument while 
interbank exposure limits (IBEX) and concentration limits (CONCRAT) are financial institution-targeted policies 
according to the categorization of macroprudential policies by Cerutti et al. (2017a). The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter is used to identify credit booms and the threshold is 1.25 standard deviations. The time period is 2000Q1-
2014Q4. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported for Logit estimations without country fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
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Table A3. Country list 
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Figure A1. Average growth rate of real domestic bank credit around boom episodes
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Figure A2. Median ratio of household and firm credit (% of GDP) around good credit booms 
 
Note: The Figure shows the median ratio of household and firm credit (% of GDP) around good credit booms (32 
episodes). A good credit boom is defined as a bank credit boom (1.75 s.d.) not followed by a systemic banking 
crisis. Both the ratio of household credit and firm credit (% of GDP) have been scaled to value 100 forty quarters 
(-40) before the first quarter of the credit boom. 
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Figure A3. Median ratio of household and firm credit (% of GDP) around bad credit booms 
 
Note: The Figure shows the median ratio of household and firm credit (% of GDP) around bad credit booms (20 
episodes). A credit boom is defined as “bad” if a systemic banking crisis occurs during the bank credit boom (1.75 
s.d.) or within three years after the end of the boom. Both the ratio of household credit and firm credit (% of GDP) 
have been scaled to value 100 forty quarters (-40) before the first quarter of the credit boom. 
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1. Introduction 
The former President of the European Central Bank Jean-Claude Trichet described systemic risk as 
financial instability “so widespread that it impairs the functioning of the financial system to the point 
where economic growth and welfare suffer materially (Trichet, 2010)”. Consequently, it is necessary to 
identify and mitigate the build-up of systemic risk to ensure financial stability (Arnold et al., 2012). 
Allen and Carletti (2013) propose that systemic risk can be divided into four different areas: (i) panics, 
(ii) asset price falls, (iii) contagion and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches. First, systemic risk can be a 
consequence of panics which can create multiple equilibria and lead to a banking crisis. For example, 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that panics can be described as self-fulfilling events. In addition, 
guarantees were used frequently at the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis which suggests that 
many policymakers believed the rise in systemic risk was due to a panic.  
Second, asset price falls are considered as important determinants of systemic risk. Several theories 
suggest that banking crises are linked to the downturn of the business cycle. A worsening of economic 
performance reduces banks’ asset value which implies that they are not able to fulfill their commitments 
(Allen and Carletti, 2013). News about a large fall in economic activity will induce depositors to 
withdraw their funds prematurely as they anticipate financial instability in the banking sector (Gorton, 
1988). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) emphasize that booms followed by busts in real estate prices and 
credit are considered as major causes of banking crises. Moreover, mispricing of assets driven by 
inefficient provision of liquidity and sovereign debt defaults are likely to also be important sources of 
systemic risk. Finally, a sharp increase in interest rates can lead to a collapse in security prices which 
implies solvency problems for banks (Allen & Carletti, 2012).  
Third, contagion has been found to be one of the most important sources of systemic risk. Contagion 
can be described as the distress a financial institution contribute to the entire financial system. The “too-
big-to-fail” paradigm emphasizes that the size of a financial institution is a key driver of contagion and 
the build-up of systemic risk. Moreover, according to the “too-interconnected-to-fail” paradigm 
contagion is not only influenced by a company’s size but also how the firm is interconnected with other 
actors in the financial system. In addition, systemic risk can be caused by common asset exposures and 
short-term debt. Contagion has often been used as an argument to intervene and provide support to 
financial institutions such as when the Federal Reserve let JP Morgan take over Bear Stearns in 2008 
(Allen & Carletti, 2012). 
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Finally, currency mismatches can lead to higher systemic risk and potentially a banking crisis. The 
foreign exchange reserves held by central banks during the Asian Crisis in 1998 were not sufficient. 
Consequently, several central banks were unable to borrow and had to ask for support from the IMF. In 
contrast to the Asian Crisis, all major central banks made agreements on foreign exchange swaps during 
the Global Financial Crisis which was essential to reduce financial instability (Allen & Carletti, 2012).   
The risk in a financial system has traditionally been viewed as the sum of the individual risks of all 
financial institutions (Allen & Carletti, 2012). The rationale of microprudential regulation is to maintain 
the stability of the financial system by ensuring the solvency of all individual financial institutions. Basel 
I and II capital accords are typically viewed as examples of microprudential regulation. However, the 
main critique against microprudential regulation is the “fallacy of composition” which implies that 
ensuring the solvency of individual institutions is not sufficient to safeguard the financial system 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009). There are two main reasons why safeguarding the solvency of financial 
institutions is not sufficient to ensure stability for the entire system: (i) to focus on the individual risk of 
financial institutions instead of the entire financial system neglect correlation risk (Acharya, 2009), (ii) 
to stabilize an individual financial institution from a microprudential perspective can lead to a 
destabilization of the entire system. An example of (ii) is if a regulator requires a troubled bank to restore 
the capital ratio in a situation where many banks are in difficulty. If the bank chooses to restore the 
capital ratio by reducing lending then this could cause a system-wide credit crunch (Hanson et al., 2011).  
Finally, De Nicólo et al. (2012) state that “the purpose of macroprudential regulation is to focus on the 
financial system as a whole, with the ultimate objective of limiting systemic risk (De Nicólo et al., 2012, 
p. 4)”.    
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of macroprudential policy on banks’ systemic risk. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that examines the link between 
macroprudential regulation and systemic risk at the bank-level in both advanced and developing 
countries. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature related to macroprudential 
policy and systemic risk. Section 3 describes the measure of systemic risk, macroprudential policies and 
control variables used in this study. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach used to assess the impact 
of macroprudential policy on systemic risk. The results are highlighted in section 5 followed by a 
discussion about robustness checks and potential extensions in section 6. Finally, concluding remarks 
are summarized in section 7.     
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2. Literature review 
Acharya (2009) provide a theoretical framework emphasizing that it is essential for prudential regulation 
to address both each bank’s individual risk as well as the correlated risk with other banks. Regulation 
that only target individual bank risk, such as capital requirements and bank closure policy, could 
unintentionally increase systemic risk in the financial system. Consequently, a macroprudential 
approach that accounts for general equilibrium effects is necessary to ensure financial stability (Hanson 
et al., 2011). The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke emphasized the importance of 
macroprudential regulation as an alternative approach to microprudential policies for dealing with 
systemic risk:  
“Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what their appropriate "field of 
vision" should be. Under our current system of safety-and-soundness regulation, supervisors often focus 
on the financial conditions of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which has 
been called systemwide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the mandate of regulators and 
supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic risks and weaknesses as well (Bernanke, 
2008).”    
Several empirical studies show that macroprudential regulation is effective to address credit and house 
price growth. Cerutti et al. (2017a) investigate the effectiveness of macroprudential policies to deal with 
credit growth. Their study which comprises twelve macroprudential policies in more than one hundred 
countries between 2000-2013 shows that macroprudential regulation reduces credit growth. Moreover, 
several recent studies confirm the effectiveness of macroprudential regulation (see for example studies 
by Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Bruno et al., 2017; and Fendoğlu, 2017). In addition, Cerutti et 
al. (2017a) emphasize the importance of investigating the effects of macroprudential policy on systemic 
risk or the probability of financial crises. However, only a few studies examine the impact of prudential 
policy on bank risk or systemic risk. 
Altunbas et al. (2018) examine the impact of macroprudential policies on bank risk for 61 advanced and 
developing countries between 1990 and 2012. The measures of bank risk used in the study are the Z-
Score and the expected default frequency (EDF). Importantly, the authors emphasize that the aim of the 
study should ideally be to assess the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to address systemic risk 
and not only bank risk. Moreover, to assess the influence of macroprudential policies on bank risk S-
GMM regressions are conducted with the yearly growth rate of bank risk as dependent variables. The 
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macroprudential policy indexes measure the net sum of tightenings (+1) and easings (-1) for each year. 
The results found suggest that: (i) macroprudential policies are effective to mitigate the build-up of bank 
risk, (ii) the effects differ depending on the characteristics of the balance sheets and (iii) the effect of a 
tightening of macroprudential instruments is larger than an easing. Finally, Altunbas et al. (2018) 
emphasize that advanced and developing countries had different experiences concerning the frequency 
of policy tightenings and easing since 2000. Consequently, pooling data from both advanced and 
developing countries significantly reduces the concern for omitted variable bias (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2013). 
Furthermore, Gauthier et al. (2012) employ a network-based structural model to measure systemic risk 
for a sample of Canadian banks. The study shows that macroprudential capital requirements can 
potentially reduce default probabilities for individual institutions and the likelihood of a systemic crisis 
by approximately 25 percent. The authors conclude that a systemic perspective on bank regulation can 
substantially increase financial stability.   
A recent study by Gehrig and Iannino (2018) investigate the impact of Basel capital regulation on 
systemic risk for European banks. First, the authors show that systemic risk as measured by SRISK has 
increased steadily during the past three decades. Importantly, most of the increase in systemic risk has 
occurred in those banks that belong to the highest quintile of the size distribution. Furthermore, evidence 
provided in the study highlight that the Basel process of capital regulation has not been effective in 
reducing systemic risk for the largest institutions. In addition, not even for smaller banks did the Basel 
process significantly decrease systemic risk.  
Finally, several recent empirical studies investigate which factors that may contribute to higher systemic 
risk. Anginer et al. (2014) find that greater competition induces banks to diversify more which reduce 
systemic risk. Moreover, Laeven et al. (2016) show that bank size increases systemic risk while bank 
capital has the opposite effect. In addition, Karolyi et al. (2018) provide evidence suggesting that cross-
border bank inflows decrease systemic risk for larger and more interconnected banks.  
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The dataset encompasses yearly data for 460 banks in 55 advanced and developing countries between 
2000-2015. Variable definitions and sources are shown in Tables A1 and A2 (Appendix 1). The 
countries included in this study and the number of banks in each country are listed in Table A3 in 
Appendix 1. 
3.1 Systemic risk measure 
The measure of systemic risk employed in this study is SRISK1 developed by Brownlees and Engle 
(2017). SRISK measures the capital shortfall of a bank conditional on a severe market decline (Engle et 
al., 2015). In other words, SRISK tells us how much capital a bank is expected to need, in addition to 
reserves, during a financial crisis. Moreover, SRISK can be interpreted as an aggregate measure of a 
bank’s exposure to systemic risk and is informative when assessing the resiliency of a bank (Gehrig and 
Iannino, 2018). 
Benoit et al. (2017) provide empirical results showing a strong link between a firm’s Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) and the systematic risk of the firm measured by beta. As has been shown by Benoit et 
al. (2017, pp. 134-135), SRISK include both MES and market capitalization which is a proxy for the 
size of the firm. Consequently, the SRISK measure takes into account both the “too-interconnected-to-
fail” and the “too-big-to-fail” paradigms (Benoit et al., 2017). Moreover, Table 1 shows that both beta 
(systematic risk) and market capitalization (size) are positively and significantly correlated with SRISK 
as expected. In addition, the evolution of the average positive SRISK between 2000 and 2015 is shown 
in Figure 1.     
Table 1. Correlation between banks’ SRISK, beta and market capitalization 
  SRISK Beta Market Cap. 
SRISK 1.000   
Beta 0.315* 1.000  
Market Cap. 0.545* 0.187* 1.000 
*signifies that the correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
 
                                                          
1 The definition of SRISK and its components is described in the paper by Benoit et al. (2017, pp. 134-135). 
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Finally, the SRISK measure has been found to be useful to identify those institutions that may have a 
large influence on systemic risk. Brownlees and Engel (2015) show in their study that those banks that 
were most likely to be bailed out by the US government and receive support from the Federal Reserve 
had the highest levels of SRISK before the crisis.    
Figure 1. Evolution of SRISK between 2000-2015 
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3.2 Macroprudential policy indexes 
Quarterly data for macroprudential instruments are compiled from the IBRN Prudential Instruments 
Database for the period 2000-2014 (Cerutti et al., 2017b). To assess the effect of macroprudential 
policies on systemic risk the indexes are included both in levels and as yearly changes. Moreover, similar 
to Altunbas et al. (2018) the indexes are aggregated to yearly time series since the control variables are 
not available in quarterly frequency. Table A2 in Appendix 1 show variable description for the 
macroprudential policies. 
The macroprudential instruments included in this study are loan-to-value caps, interbank exposure 
limits, concentration limits and reserve requirements on accounts denominated in local or foreign 
currency. Moreover, an aggregate index MAPP (ΔMAPP) is constructed including all instruments to 
better measure the overall impact of the macroprudential policies. In addition, since reserve 
requirements are mainly used in developing countries a sub-index MAPP_RR (ΔMAPP_RR) is created 
only including reserve requirements policies. Loan-to-value caps, interbank exposure limits and 
concentration limits are included in the sub-index MAPP_B_FI (ΔMAPP_B_FI). Table 2 show 
descriptive statistics for all indexes with macroprudential policies.    
The level of macroprudential instruments can be viewed as a measure of the “macroprudential policy 
stance” in a country. Following the approach used by Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) the 
cumulative sum of tightenings (+1) net of easings (-1) since the first quarter of 2000 is used as a proxy 
for macroprudential instruments’ tightness. However, for reserve requirements RR_D and RR_FX, a 
tightening (easing) can take a value higher (lower) than +1 (-1) which better captures the intensity of the 
changes. Consequently, for the aggregate indexes MAPP and MAPP_RR where reserve requirements 
are included the instruments are constrained to take a maximum (minimum) value of +1 (-1) in each 
quarter. The cumulative sum of tightenings net of easings in the fourth quarter is used when aggregating 
the data to yearly frequency. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the macroprudential instruments (in 
levels) between 2000 and 2015.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of macroprudential instruments (averages) between 2000-2015
 
Furthermore, following the approach in the study by Altunbas et al. (2018) indexes measuring changes 
in macroprudential policies are constructed. A tightening action of a policy takes value +1 and an easing 
action -1 as for the cumulative indexes. However, the change in a macroprudential instrument is 
measured as the sum of tightenings net of easings for each year separately. Consequently, this index can 
take values 0, -1 or 1, …, -4 or 4 for those instruments (i.e. ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, and ΔCONCRAT) 
where a tightening (easing) has a maximum (minimum) value of 1 (-1) in each quarter. Consequently, 
the value for reserve requirements instruments ΔRR_D and ΔRR_FX can be lower or higher than -4 and 
4. The reserve requirements instruments are constrained to take a maximum (minimum) value 1 (-1) in 
each quarter when included the aggregate indexes ΔMAPP and ΔMAPP_RR. Figure 3 illustrates the 
sum of all tightening and easing actions between 2000-2015.        
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Figure 3. Number of macroprudential policy actions between 2000-2015
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for macroprudential indexes
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3.3 Control variables 
Several control variables which have been found to influence systemic risk are included in the 
estimations (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). First, the bank-level measures are size and leverage similar 
to the papers by Altunbas et al. (2018) and Karolyi et al. (2017). The variable leverage is divided by ten 
thousand to ease interpretation. Second, in addition to the bank-specific measures, several country-level 
variables are also included following Karolyi et al. (2017). Real GDP growth controls for economic 
performance and is likely to affect systemic risk. Moreover, non-interest income is a proxy for non-core 
banking activities and concentration measures the share of assets held by the three largest banks. In 
addition, market return and volatility are included to account for the development of the stock market. 
Finally, the variable log (GDP per capita) is included to control for the level of development. 
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4. Empirical Approach 
To begin with, this study aims to investigate whether a tighter macroprudential policy stance in a country 
is associated with a lower ratio of SRISK-to-GDP for banks. The macroprudential policy stance is 
measured by the cumulative sum of tightenings (+1) net of easings (-1) since 2000 following the 
approach in Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and Epure et al. (2017). Figure 2 illustrates the 
average cumulative measure for the macroprudential instruments included in this study. Moreover, since 
this is a cross-country study SRISK has been scaled by real GDP in all estimations following the 
approach in Karolyi et al. (2018) and Engle et al. (2015). OLS regressions with only year fixed effects 
or both year and country (or bank) fixed effects are estimated to examine the link between 
macroprudential policy conditions and the level of systemic risk for banks.  
Moreover, Gehrig and Iannino (2018) show in their study that the evolution of SRISK for European 
banks has been non-linear during the period 2000-2015. They find that the very large build-up of SRISK 
since 2000 has been driven mainly by the upper two quintiles of banks. Consequently, quantile 
regressions are estimated to address the presence of non-linearities following the approach in the study 
by Gehrig and Iannino (2018). The quantile regressions are estimated for the 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 
quantiles including country effects and year dummies with standard errors clustered for banks (Parente 
et al., 2016). As an approximation for country “fixed effects” the Mundlak-Chamberlein device is 
applied which include time averages of all time-varying regressors (Wooldridge, 2010; Chamberlin & 
Ricker-Gilbert, 2016).        
In addition, the global financial crisis began in the middle of the period which is likely to have a 
substantial influence on the results. Figure 1 illustrates that SRISK increased rapidly from 2007 at the 
same time as macroprudential policies were tightened more frequently shown in Figure 3. Consequently, 
it is likely that the results for the period 2000-2006 are different from the period 2007-2015. Following 
the approach by Bruno et al. (2017) dummies are constructed for the period 2000-2006 (pre 2007) and 
2007-2015 (post 2007). Interaction variables are constructed with the period dummies and aggregate 
macroprudential indexes as well as individual macroprudential instruments. 
Furthermore, the next step is to investigate whether the macroprudential policy stance influences the 
growth rate of banks’ SRISK. Regressions with the same cumulative macroprudential policy indexes as 
before are estimated but this time with the log percentage change in SRISK scaled by real GDP as the 
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dependent variable. This approach has been employed by Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) when 
assessing the effectiveness of macroprudential policies to address credit growth.  
Finally, regressions with yearly changes in macroprudential policies are conducted following the 
approach in the study by Altunbas et al. (2018). Macroprudential policy changes are defined as the sum 
of tightenings net of easings within one year. Consequently, in contrast to the cumulative index, this 
measure does not account for all previous tightenings and easings since 2000. However, using indexes 
with the yearly change instead of the cumulative sum may be a more precise way to examine if 
macroprudential policies influence the growth rate of systemic risk. Period dummies are included in all 
estimations since endogeneity between macroprudential policies and SRISK after 2007 is likely to be 
stronger for indexes with yearly changes. In addition, dynamic system GMM regressions are conducted 
following the approach in the study by Altunbas et al. (2018) as a robustness check.                     
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5. Results 
Estimations with aggregate macroprudential indexes (in levels) and SRISK scaled by real GDP are 
shown in Table 3. The coefficient for the aggregate index MAPP which includes all five macroprudential 
instruments has a negative and highly significant coefficient in estimations with only year or year and 
country fixed effects. However, the coefficient is negative but not significant in the estimation with year 
and bank fixed effects. Moreover, the index including borrower- and financial institutions-targeted 
instruments MAPP_B_FI is not significant in any of the estimations. In addition, the coefficient for the 
index MAPP_RR with two reserve requirements instruments is negative and significant in all 
estimations. 
Results for 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 quantile regressions are shown in Table A4 in Appendix 2. The 
coefficient for the MAPP index is negative and highly significant for 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles but not for 
the 0.25 quantile. Interestingly, in contrast to the previous results both indexes MAPP_B_FI and 
MAPP_RR are negative and highly significant for the 0.50 and 0.75 quantile regressions. The results 
suggest that a tighter macroprudential stance is negatively associated with SRISK-to-GDP for banks at 
upper quantiles. 
Furthermore, estimations with macroprudential policy indexes interacted with period dummies are 
shown in Table A5 in Appendix 2. The MAPP index is negative and highly significant in all estimations 
without bank fixed effects. Moreover, the coefficient for the MAPP_B_FI index is negative and 
significant at the 10% level in the estimation with year and country fixed effects contrary to the results 
in Table 3. In addition, MAPP_B_FI is highly significant for the period 2000-2006 in the estimation 
with both year and bank fixed effects. Finally, the coefficient for the index MAPP_RR is negative and 
significant except for the pre-2007 period in the estimation with both year and bank fixed effects. 
Several control variables are found to be significant in the estimations with SRISK scaled by GDP as 
the dependent variable. The bank-specific variables size and leverage have coefficients with different 
signs depending on the type of fixed effects included in the specification. The coefficient for the size of 
the company is positive and highly significant for estimations with only year or year and country fixed 
effects. However, in the estimations with year and bank fixed effects the coefficient is negative and 
highly significant. Similarly, the coefficient for leverage is negative and significant in estimations with 
only year fixed effect but turns positive and significant with bank fixed effects. Moreover, the 
coefficients for real GDP growth and market return are negative and highly significant in estimations 
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with year and country fixed effects but not when bank controls are included. In addition, the coefficients 
for volatility and concentration are both positive and significant in estimations with only year dummies 
but insignificant with bank fixed effects.       
Table 4 shows the results for the log annual percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP and 
cumulative macroprudential indexes. The aggregate index MAPP is found to be positive and significant 
for the post-2007 period as expected. In addition, loan-to-value caps (LTV_CAP) and reserve 
requirements on accounts denominated in local or foreign currency (RR_D and RR_FX) also have 
positive and significant coefficients for the post-2007 period. However, the coefficients for loan-to-
value caps and concentration limits are negative and significant for estimations with year and country 
fixed effects for the pre-2007 period. The coefficient for concentration limits is also negative and 
significant for the post-2007 period in all estimations. It should be emphasized that none of the 
coefficients are positive and significant for the pre-2007 period.    
Table 5 shows the results for the yearly change in aggregate macroprudential indexes with the log annual 
percentage change in SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the 
ΔMAPP index is negative and significant at the 10% level for the pre-2007 period in all estimations. 
Moreover, the coefficients for ΔMAPP_B_FI and ΔMAPP_RR are negative but typically insignificant 
for the pre-2007 period. One exception is the coefficient for ΔMAPP_RR during the pre-2007 period in 
the estimation with only year fixed effects. For the period after the start of the global financial crisis 
(post 2007), the coefficients for all three macroprudential indexes are positive and highly significant.     
Finally, Table 6 shows the results for the yearly change in individual macroprudential instruments and 
the log percentage change in the SRISK-to-GDP ratio. All coefficients for the macroprudential 
instruments are negative for the period 2000-2006. However, only the coefficients for the change in 
loan-to-value caps (ΔLTV_CAP) and reserve requirements on accounts denominated in local currency 
(ΔRR_D) are negative and significant. In addition, the coefficients for changes in loan-to-value caps 
(ΔLTV_CAP) and reserve requirements on accounts denominated in foreign currency (ΔRR_FX) are 
positive and significant for the post-2007 period. 
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Table 3. Estimations with macroprudential indexes (in levels) and SRISK-to-GDP 
 
Notes: Table showing regressions with SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent variable. The MAPP index 
includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). Moreover, the 
sub-index MAPP_B_FI is the sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. In addition, MAPP_RR include both 
reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). Macroprudential indexes measure the cumulative sum of 
tightenings net of easings since 2000 (Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The time period is 2000-2015 and all 
independent variables are lagged one period. The standard errors are clustered for banks.     
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Table 4. Estimations with macroprudential indexes (in levels) and growth of SRISK
 
Notes: Table showing regressions with log percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent 
variable. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, 
and RR_FX). Macroprudential indexes measure the cumulative sum of tightenings net of easings since 2000 
(Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 2007”) takes value 1 for the years 
2000-2006 (2007-2015) and zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and all independent variables are 
lagged one period. The standard errors are clustered for banks.     
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Table 5. Estimations with changes in macroprudential indexes and growth of SRISK
 
Notes: Table showing regressions with log percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent 
variable. The ΔMAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, ΔCONCRAT, 
ΔRR_D, and ΔRR_FX). Moreover, the sub-index ΔMAPP_B_FI is the sum of ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, and 
ΔCONCRAT. In addition, ΔMAPP_RR include both reserve requirement instruments (ΔRR_D and ΔRR_FX). 
Macroprudential indexes measure the sum of tightenings net of easings for each year separately (Altunbas et al., 
2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 2007”) takes value 1 for the years 2000-2006 (2007-2015) and 
zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and all independent variables are lagged one period. The standard 
errors are clustered for banks.     
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Table 6. Estimations with changes in macroprudential policies and growth of SRISK
 
Notes: Table showing regressions with log percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent 
variable. Macroprudential indexes measure the sum of tightenings net of easings for each year separately 
(Altunbas et al., 2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 2007”) takes value 1 for the years 2000-2006 
(2007-2015) and zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and all independent variables are lagged one 
period. The standard errors are clustered for banks.  
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6. Robustness analysis 
The results discussed in the previous section showed that tighter macroprudential policy conditions are 
negatively associated with the ratio of SRISK-to-GDP for banks. However, if developing countries both 
have a tighter macroprudential policy stance and a lower ratio of SRISK-to-GDP for banks then it is 
essential to control for the income level between countries in pooled estimations.  
Consequently, Table A6 (Appendix 2) show similar estimations as in Table 3 but this time also including 
the log of GDP per capita or dummies for advanced and EU countries. The coefficient for the MAPP 
index is negative and significant at the 5 percent level in estimations with year fixed effects including 
GDP per capita or dummies for advanced and EU countries. However, the MAPP index is not significant 
in estimations with both year and country or bank fixed effects with GDP per capita. Moreover, similar 
results are found for the MAPP_RR index but the MAPP_B_FI index is not significant in any of the 
estimations. Finally, the results for quantile regressions shown in Table A4 (Appendix 2) generally hold 
also when including GDP per capita but the coefficients have lower significance (MAPP_B_FI is not 
significant). In addition, the coefficients for MAPP, MAPP_B_FI and MAPP_RR are negative and 
highly significant for the 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles when including advanced and EU country dummies. 
Table A7 (Appendix 2) show results for estimations with the change in macroprudential indexes and 
GDP per capita or dummies for advanced and EU countries. The coefficient for the ΔMAPP index is 
negative and significant at the 10% level in all estimations for the pre-2007 period. Moreover, the sub-
index MAPP_RR is negative and significant at the 5% level prior to the Global Financial Crisis when 
only including year controls and at the 10% level with country or bank fixed effects. However, the 
coefficient for the sub-index with borrower- and financial institutions-targeted instruments MAPP_B_FI 
is negative but not significant in any of the estimations. As expected, all the aggregate indexes have 
positive and significant coefficients for the post-2007 period. 
Furthermore, dynamic system GMM estimations are conducted to further try to address endogeneity 
between macroprudential policies and SRISK following the approach in Altunbas et al. (2018). Table 7 
shows the results for GMM estimations with aggregate indexes and macroprudential instruments. The 
change in the aggregate index including all macroprudential instruments (ΔMAPP) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level for the pre-2007 period. Moreover, the coefficient for the sub-index 
MAPP_B_FI is negative and significant at the 1% level while the MAPP_RR coefficient is only 
significant at the 10% level for the period 2000-2006.  
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Table 7. Dynamic GMM estimations with changes in macroprudential indexes
 
Notes: Table showing dynamic system GMM estimations with log percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP 
as the dependent variable. The ΔMAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, 
ΔCONCRAT, ΔRR_D, and ΔRR_FX). Moreover, the sub-index ΔMAPP_B_FI is the sum of ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, 
and ΔCONCRAT. In addition, ΔMAPP_RR include both reserve requirement instruments (ΔRR_D and ΔRR_FX). 
Macroprudential indexes measure the sum of tightenings net of easings for each year separately (Altunbas et al., 
2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 2007”) takes value 1 for the years 2000-2006 (2007-2015) and 
zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and all independent variables are lagged one period. The standard 
errors are clustered for banks. 
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Finally, among the individual macroprudential instruments, it is only reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in local currency (ΔRR_D) that is negative and significant for the pre-2007 period. All 
aggregate indexes and ΔRR_D have positive and significant coefficients for the period 2007-2015. 
Finally, the Hansen J-test and Arellano Bond AR(2) test are important to verify that the system GMM 
estimator is consistent. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis in all estimations which suggest that 
the model specifications are suitable (Altunbas et al. 2018).   
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7. Conclusion 
The ultimate objective of macroprudential regulation is to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk in the 
financial system according to De Nicólo et al. (2012). The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
impact of macroprudential policies on banks’ systemic risk. The analysis includes yearly data on 
systemic risk (SRISK) for 460 banks in 55 advanced and developing countries between 2000-2015. 
The results suggest that the macroprudential policy stance (i.e. the cumulative sum of tightenings net of 
easings since 2000) for the aggregate index including five instruments is negatively associated with the 
ratio of SRISK scaled by GDP. This result is generally robust also when controlling for the level of 
development. In addition, tighter conditions for concentration limits seem to reduce the future growth 
rate of systemic risk. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that also yearly changes in macroprudential policies 
influence the growth rate of systemic risk. The findings suggest that a tightening of aggregate 
macroprudential indexes prior to the Global Financial Crisis was associated with a lower growth rate of 
systemic risk one year ahead. Moreover, this finding is stronger for S-GMM estimations which better 
can address potential endogeneity between macroprudential policies and systemic risk. In addition, the 
results further suggest that a tightening of loan-to-value-caps or reserve requirements on accounts 
denominated in local currency lowered the growth rate of systemic risk before 2007. 
To sum up, this is one of the first studies examining the impact of macroprudential regulation on banks’ 
systemic risk. The results suggest that macroprudential policies can be effective to mitigate the build-
up of systemic risk.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
   
Variable Definition Source 
   
Dependent variables   
SRISK-to-GDP Positive SRISK scaled by real GDP. 
NYU's V-Lab, World Bank 
Databank 
Δ(SRISK-to-GDP) 
Log annual change in positive SRISK scaled by 
real GDP. 
 
NYU's V-Lab, World Bank 
Databank 
   
 
Control variables 
  
Size Log of market capitalization (bank-level data). 
 
NYU's V-Lab 
Leverage 
 
Leverage ratio (bank-level data). The leverage 
ratio is defined as the sum of book value of total 
liabilities and market capitalization as percent of 
market capitalization. 
NYU's V-Lab 
Real GDP growth The year-over-year change in GDP. 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
Volatility The annual stock market volatility. 
 
Global Financial 
Development Database. 
Market return The annual stock market return. 
 
Global Financial 
Development Database. 
Non-interest income 
 
The annual value for aggregate non-interest 
income relative to the banking system's total 
income. 
Global Financial 
Development Database. 
Concentration 
The assets of the three largest commercial banks as 
percent of total assets for the banking sector.  
 
Global Financial 
Development Database. 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table A2. Macroprudential variable definitions and sources 
   
Variable Definition Source 
 
Levels 
  
LTV_CAP 
 
Cumulative change (sum of tightenings net of easings since 2000) in 
the Loan-to-Value Cap.  
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
IBEX 
 
Cumulative change in the interbank exposure limit. Limits banks 
exposures to other banks. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
CONCRAT 
 
Cumulative change in concentration limits. Limits banks’ exposures 
to specific borrowers or sectors. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
RR_D 
 
Cumulative change in reserve requirements on local currency-
denominated accounts. This instrument can take values higher or 
lower than 1 or -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
RR_FX 
 
Cumulative change in reserve requirements on foreign currency-
denominated accounts. This instrument can take values higher or 
lower than 1 or -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP 
 
Sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX. All 
individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and minimum 
changes of 1 and -1 in each quarter. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP_B_FI Sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
MAPP_RR 
Sum of RR_D and RR_FX. All individual instruments are adjusted to 
have maximum and minimum changes of 1 and -1 in each quarter. 
 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
 
Changes 
  
ΔLTV_CAP 
Yearly change (sum of tightenings net of easings for each year 
separately) in the Loan-to-Value Cap.  
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔIBEX Yearly change in the instrument interbank exposure limits.  
 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔCONCRAT Yearly change in the instrument concentration limits.  
 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔRR_D 
 
Yearly change in the instrument reserve requirements on local 
currency-denominated accounts.  
 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔRR_FX 
 
Yearly change in the instrument reserve requirements on foreign 
currency-denominated accounts.  
 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔMAPP 
 
Sum of ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, ΔCONCRAT, ΔRR_D, and ΔRR_FX. 
All individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and 
minimum changes of 1 and -1 in each year. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔMAPP_B_FI 
 
Sum of ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, and ΔCONCRAT. All individual 
instruments are adjusted to have maximum and minimum changes of 
1 and -1 in each year. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
ΔMAPP_RR 
 
Sum of ΔRR_D and ΔRR_FX. All individual instruments are adjusted 
to have maximum and minimum changes of 1 and -1 in each year. 
Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
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Table A3. List of countries 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A4. Quantile regressions with macroprudential indexes (in levels) 
Notes: Table showing results for 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 quantile regressions with SRISK scaled by real GDP as the 
dependent variable. The MAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, 
RR_D, and RR_FX). Moreover, the sub-index MAPP_B_FI is the sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. In 
addition, MAPP_RR include both reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). As an approximation to 
“fixed effects” the Mundlak-Chamberlein device is applied which include time averages of all time-varying 
regressors (Wooldridge, 2010). Year effects are captured by year dummies. Macroprudential indexes measure the 
cumulative sum of tightenings net of easings since 2000 (Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The time period is 
2000-2015 and all independent variables are lagged one period. The standard errors are clustered for banks 
(Parente et al., 2016).     
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Table A5. Estimations with macroprudential indexes (in levels) and different periods 
 
Notes: Table showing regressions with SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent variable. The MAPP index 
includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). Moreover, the 
sub-index MAPP_B_FI is the sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. In addition, MAPP_RR include both 
reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). Macroprudential indexes measure the cumulative sum of 
tightenings net of easings since 2000 (Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 
2007”) takes value 1 for the years 2000-2006 (2007-2015) and zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and 
all independent variables are lagged one period. The standard errors are clustered for banks.     
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Table A6. Macroprudential indexes (in levels) and controls for level of development 
Notes: Table showing regressions with SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent variable. The MAPP index 
includes all five macroprudential instruments (LTV_CAP, IBEX, CONCRAT, RR_D, and RR_FX). Moreover, the 
sub-index MAPP_B_FI is the sum of LTV_CAP, IBEX, and CONCRAT. In addition, MAPP_RR include both 
reserve requirement instruments (RR_D and RR_FX). Macroprudential indexes measure the cumulative sum of 
tightenings net of easings since 2000 (Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The dummy variables “pre 2007” (“post 
2007”) takes value 1 for the years 2000-2006 (2007-2015) and zero otherwise. The time period is 2000-2015 and 
all independent variables are lagged one period (except for advanced and EU country dummies). The standard 
errors are clustered for banks. 
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Table A7. Changes in macroprudential indexes and controls for level of development 
Notes: Table showing regressions with log percentage change of SRISK scaled by real GDP as the dependent 
variable. The ΔMAPP index includes all five macroprudential instruments (ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, ΔCONCRAT, 
ΔRR_D, and ΔRR_FX). Moreover, the sub-index ΔMAPP_B_FI is the sum of ΔLTV_CAP, ΔIBEX, and 
ΔCONCRAT. In addition, ΔMAPP_RR include both reserve requirement instruments (ΔRR_D and ΔRR_FX). 
Macroprudential indexes measure the sum of tightenings net of easings for each year separately (Altunbas et al., 
2018). The time period is 2000-2015 and all independent variables are lagged one period (except for advanced 
and EU country dummies). The standard errors are clustered for banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
